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Chapter 2. Rent-Seeking as Process  
 
 Mushtaq H. Khan 
 
(in Khan, M.H. and Jomo K.S. ed. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 2000). 
 
So far in our analysis of rents, we have looked only at the implications of the rents 
themselves and not at the implications of the processes through which rents are 
created or maintained. In fact, since rents are, by definition, beneficial for the 
recipients, they are likely to spend resources to create, maintain, or transfer particular 
rents. Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources and effort in creating, maintaining, 
or transferring rents. These expenditures can be legal, as with most forms of 
lobbying, queuing, or contributions to political parties. But they can also be illegal, as 
in the case of bribes, illegal political contributions, expenditures on private mafias, 
and so on. The processes are of tremendous significance because the resources they 
use up are a social cost, and they determine the types of rents which are created and 
maintained in a particular society. 
 
Conventional rent-seeking theory, however, assumes that rent-seeking only results in 
the creation or protection of monopoly rents, and in addition, it makes restrictive 
assumptions about how the rent-seeking cost is determined. Nevertheless, the 
contribution of this theory was to tell us that the cost of rent-seeking was an additional 
cost of maintaining a monopoly. However, the conventional rent-seeking framework 
has to be radically extended if it is to be relevant for the real world. Institutional 
economics and political economy both suggest directions in which the rent-seeking 
framework can be extended. First, we have seen that rents and the economic rights 
underpinning them are closely related. Rent-seeking is, therefore, closely related to 
processes of institutional change through which economic rights are altered. 
Institutional economics tells us that the outcomes of institutional change are far from 
straightforward, and can depend on a number of variables, including the incentives set 
by pre-existing institutions. Secondly, attempts to change the structure of rents can 
also unleash distributive conflicts. Political economy tells us that political variables, 
and in particular, the distribution of political power, can determine which individuals 
or groups are likely to win distributive contests. Thus, a more general approach to 
rent-seeking can incorporate political and institutional variables to explain first, how 
much effort is actually expended in rent-seeking, and secondly, the types of rights and 
rents which are created as a result. 
 
The modern interest in rent-seeking emerged from a few seminal articles written in 
the seventies (in particular, Krueger 1974; Posner 1975) which argued that the costs 
involved in seeking monopoly rents were much larger than the relatively small 
deadweight welfare losses associated with the monopoly rents themselves. Their 
purpose was to alert liberal economists that the social cost of monopolies artificially 
maintained by the state was much larger than conventional theory had established, 
since there was an additional rent-seeking cost associated with monopolies. While 
these early papers were limited in their assumptions, both about the types of rents and 
the types of rent-seeking, they offered a potentially fruitful way of thinking about 
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processes of economic, political and institutional transforma tion in an integrated 
framework. However, much of the rent-seeking literature has remained limited in its 
assumptions and the development of an integrated approach has not made much 
progress. 
 
One problem in most of the rent-seeking literature has been that it has concentrated 
almost exclusively on the social costs of the resources used up in rent-seeking and 
very little on the different types of rents which rent-seeking has created in different 
contexts. This is partly because the analysis of the cost or “input” side of the rent-
seeking story is relatively simple compared to an analysis of the “rent-outcomes”, 
equivalent to the “output” of rent-seeking, which are the different types of rents which 
can be created, maintained or transferred as a result. Nevertheless, we will argue that 
the overall effects of rent-seeking depend on both the cost incurred and the rent 
created. 
 
This chapter extends the rent-seeking approach by systematically dealing with both 
the inputs and the “rent-outcomes” of rent-seeking. The economic implications of the 
rent-outcomes can vary because any of the rents discussed in Chapter 1 could be 
sought or protected through a rent-seeking process. The rent-seeking cost, as 
conventionally defined, is the “input” cost of the process, which can also vary 
significantly. We are particularly interested in political and institutional variables as 
determinants both of the input cost of rent-seeking and also of the rent-outcomes or 
“outputs” produced by the rent-seeking. This is important because political variables, 
in particular, have generally received little attention in rent-seeking models developed 
by economists. On the other hand, political scientists have looked at the effects of 
power and institutions in processes of institutional change, but largely in isolation 
from the work of economists on rents. We argue that the insights of both disciplines 
can be fruitfully integrated. 
 
An integrated approach can also show the importance of evolution and change. Rent-
seeking processes which were growth-enhancing in one period can cease to be so later 
on, or vice versa. This is because the determinants of the input costs and the types of 
rents created are themselves changing. We use evidence from South Korea, Malaysia, 
the Indian subcontinent and Thailand to illustrate how a number of variables can 
explain the different outcomes associated with rent-seeking across countries and over 
time. 
 
The core argument of this chapter is that rent-seeking has to be seen as a process 
whose overall effect depends on its two related components. The first is the net social 
cost or benefit associated with the rents which are the outcome of the rent-seeking 
process. The very different net social benefits which can be associated with some 
important types of rents were discussed in the last chapter. The second is the rent-
seeking cost, which is the social cost of the activities which aim to create, maintain or 
re-allocate these rents. On the one hand, the analysis of the social desirability of 
different rents, as carried out in the last chapter, is misleading on its own because each 
of these rents will call forth associated rent-seeking expenditures. On the other hand, 
an analysis of the rent-seeking cost on its own is also misleading, since the same rent-
seeking cost can be associated with the creation, maintenance or transfer of many 
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different types of rent-generating rights.  
 
There is a close analogy with the inputs and outputs in conventional production. In 
everyday production processes, the net value added is what matters. This depends not 
just on the total cost incurred but also on the value of the output produced. Production 
can be profitable even with very large costs if highly valued products are produced. 
Conversely, production may be unviable even when costs are low, if what is produced 
is of no value. In exactly the same way it would be misleading to look at the rent-
seeking cost without asking what type of rent was created as a result. Figure 2.1 
shows this. The net effect of any rent-seeking process depends on both the rent-
seeking cost, which is equivalent to the cost of inputs used up in this process, and the 
value of the rights and rents produced as the outcome, which is equivalent to the value 
of the “output” in this case. Unfortunately, much of the analysis of rent-seeking which 
has influenced policy-making has typically ignored differences in the value of the 
outcomes of rent-seeking and has concentrated exclusively on the rent-seeking cost. 
The conventional analysis of the rent-seeking cost has also been very simplistic, 
failing to address why the rent-seeking cost can vary significantly from case to case. 
 
Conventional Production Process
Net Value Added = Gross Value of Final Output
Rent-Seeking Process
Net Effect = Net Social Benefit Associated withthe Rent-Outcome
Cost of Inputs Used in Rent-Seeking
(the Rent Seeking Cost)
Inputs used up in Rent-Seeking
 (The Rent-Seeking Cost:
Inputs used up in Lobbying,
Political Activity, Bribing and
other Influencing Activities)
Rent-Outcomes: Economic
Rights are created, maintained,
destroyed or transferred to
create specific Rents (for
instance, Licenses are
allocated, Monopolies and
Subsidies granted, Property
Rights created)
Inputs used up in Production
(Labour, Capital, Land)
Final Outputs
(Goods and Services)
Cost of Inputs Used Up
 
Figure 2.1 Rent-Seeking Compared to a Conventional Production Process 
 
Section 2.1 discusses the distinction between the inputs and rent-outcomes of rent-
seeking and their role in explaining the differential performance of countries. We 
argue that rent-seeking has to be looked at as a process, and that focussing only on the 
input costs of rent-seeking fails to explain the historical evidence and is misleading 
for policy.  
 
Section 2.2 looks at the type of evidence which an integrated rent-seeking framework 
must address. We look at the types of rents which existed in the industrial sectors in 
the Indian subcontinent, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand during the seventies and 
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eighties, the changes happening over the nineties, and the evidence about rent-seeking 
costs. This evidence suggests that differences in rent-seeking costs (the input costs) 
were probably less important in explaining differential performance compared to 
differences in the types of rents created as the outcomes of rent-seeking. 
 
Section 2.3 looks at another aspect of the empirical evidence. Knowing the types of 
rents and the rent-seeking costs is not enough, we also want to know who was 
engaged in rent-seeking. The organization and relative power of classes and groups 
varies greatly across countries. Since a significant part of rent-seeking in developing 
countries is organized through patron-client networks, looking at how they were 
organized provides insights into the social and political aspects of the rent-seeking 
process. We argue this has important implications for the economics of rent-seeking. 
 
Section 2.4 examines the input side of the rent-seeking process and the determinants 
of the rent-seeking cost. We begin with the conventional rent-seeking analysis which 
says that the rent-seeking cost is equal to the size of the rent being sought. This simple 
model is where much of rent-seeking theory stops. However, even if we focus on the 
input cost of rent-seeking, much more needs to be said. We see that the conventional 
model only identifies the rent-seeking expenditure and not the rent-seeking cost. 
Furthermore, we see that the organization of state institutions and the distribution of 
political power can significantly increase or decrease the input cost of rent-seeking.  
 
Section 2.5 examines the factors which may explain why rent-seeking can produce 
very different rent-outcomes in the form of different types of rents. Some rents add 
value for society, others do the reverse. Why does rent-seeking sometimes produce 
one type of rent and sometimes another? This section goes beyond the traditional rent-
seeking literature to look at what we can learn from institutional economics and 
political economy. We distinguish between three different rent-seeking scenarios and 
identify the conditions under which value-enhancing rents will be created in each. In 
the first, individuals seek rents through private negotiations in which the state plays 
no part. In the second, individuals spend resources trying to influence the state to 
create the rents they want. And in the third, the state takes the initiative in creating 
rents. In each case, a different set of conditions is required to ensure that the rents 
created promote growth and efficiency. These conditions can be classified into a 
number of political and institutional conditions, and once again, the political variables 
emerge as substantially important. We then ask if this list of theoretical conditions 
helps to explain the different overall effects of rent-seeking observed in our countries. 
We argue that by including political and institutional variables in our explanatory 
framework we can make a start in understanding some of these differences. Section 
2.6 concludes. We argue that our extended framework can provide a better 
explanation of difference in the net effects of rent-seeking and can serve as the 
starting point for policy debates about the future direction of reform. 
 
2.1 Inputs and Rent-Outcomes in the Rent-seeking Process  
 
While rent-seekers are only interested in the rents which they can capture for 
themselves, the social value of these rents can vary widely. The social value of any 
rent is our shorthand for describing the net social benefit over time associated with the 
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rights which generate the particular rent. In Chapter 1 we saw that the net social 
benefit associated with different rents can vary widely, depending on the rent, but also 
on political and institutional conditions. Thus, rents could be associated with very 
negative consequences for society (for instance, learning rents which failed to 
generate learning because of the state's failure or inability to monitor and allocate 
these rents effectively) but also with very positive consequences (for instance, 
learning rents which delivered rapid technical progress). We shall see that the rent-
seeking cost can also vary. In some cases the rights of the rent-seekers are assured and 
the rent-seeking cost can be low (though it is still a cost). In other cases, the rent-
seeking cost may be very high. The net effect of rent-seeking processes can thus vary 
both because of the value of the rent-outcome and because of differences in rent-
seeking costs. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows how different combinations of rent-seeking costs with different 
types of rents can result in very different net effects for the rent-seeking process. The 
net effect is high and positive in quadrant IV where high valued rents are created and 
maintained at low rent-seeking cost. The net effect is less positive in quadrant I where 
the rent-seeking cost is high, but the net effect can still be positive. Then comes 
quadrant III, where negatively valued rents are created, but because the rent-seeking 
cost is low, the negative net effect is not too bad. The worst is quadrant II, where 
negatively valued rents are created and the rent-seeking cost is high.  
Social Value of the Rent-Outcome
Negative Positive
Rent-
Seeking
Cost
High
Low
Conventional
Market Models
Conventional
Rent-Seeking
Models
Conventional
Developmental
State Models
Likely Range of Net Effects in Reality:
Variations largely due to Variations in Rents
I. Net Effect Intermediate
because of High Rent-
Seeking Costs
II.  Net Effect Very Negative
III.  Net Effect Negative
because of Negatively
Valued Rents
IV.  Net Effect Very Positive
Note: Net Effect of Rent Seeking = Social Value of Rent Outcome
(Net Social Benefit associated with the Rent) - Rent Seeking Cost
Figure 2.2 Rent-Seeking Costs, Rent-Outcomes and the Net Effects of Rent-Seeking 
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Before the analysis of rent-seeking was developed, the market model of neoclassical 
economics explained differences in performance solely in terms of market 
inefficiencies. Not only was there no recognition of rent-seeking costs, the range of 
rents recognized was also rather narrow. Some positively valued rents were 
recognized, such as natural resource rents, but most rents, like monopoly rents, 
signalled small negative net social benefits. Differences in performance between 
countries were therefore explained in terms of a small area of variation due to 
differences in government policy in the region marked “conventional market models” 
at the bottom of Figure 2.2. Not surprisingly, these models could not satisfactorily 
explain the large differences in the performance of countries.  
 
The first generation of rent-seeking models addressed this problem by arguing that 
even if only mildly damaging rents exist, the net effect is crippling because of high 
rent-seeking costs (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; Buchanan 1980; Tullock 1980a; see 
also Mueller 1989: 229-46 for a review). These models combined high rent-seeking 
costs with monopoly rents, locating the net effects of rent-seeking in the box marked 
“conventional rent-seeking models” at the top of Figure 2.2 in quadrant II. These 
models explained differences in performance by arguing that interventionist countries 
were located in this rent-seeking box while free-market economies were located in the 
right-hand corner of the “conventional market model” box. 
 
The high rent-seeking cost in the early rent-seeking models was soon challenged in 
second generation models which relaxed some of their assumptions. It was shown that 
under different institutional structures, the rent-seeking cost could be much lower, 
despite intervention (for instance, Congleton 1980; Rogerson 1982; reviewed in 
Mueller 1989). The rent-seeking cost could thus vary along a much wider range and 
the existence of rents was not sufficient to imply large rent-seeking costs. However, 
rent-seeking models still did not consider the full range of rents which could be the 
outcome of rent-seeking.  
 
The assumption that rent-seeking always results in the creation of value-reducing 
rents was dropped in a few of the early models of rent-seeking (for instance, Bhagwati 
1982). Bhagwati considers a model where rent-seeking results in the destruction of 
value-reducing rents. Although this is equivalent to the creation of value-enhancing 
rights, Bhagwati did not directly consider the latter possibility. Nevertheless, his 
model showed that society can be better off after rent-seeking. The insight that rent-
seeking can produce an outcome of socially beneficial rents and rights first began to 
emerge in the institutional economics literature where rent-seeking was seen as a 
process through which the structure of rights in society can change (see, for instance, 
North 1990). 
 
Greater interest in differences in rent-outcomes also began to emerge with the re-
evaluation of the success stories of East Asia during their high growth period, which 
suggested that these countries were not really free-market at all. To a greater or lesser 
degree, East Asian states had allocated subsidies in socially beneficial ways (Amsden 
1989: 145-7; Kim & Ma 1997). This evidence, together with developments within 
neoclassical theory on the role of rents in generating innovation or in inducing better 
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monitoring suggested that some rents could be associated with substantial value-
enhancement for society (Stiglitz 1996; Aoki, Murdock, & Okuno-Fujiwara 1997). 
But if rent-seeking costs were high, the benefit of creating socially valuable rents 
would be cancelled out. Models of developmental states therefore drew on the 
analysis of rent-seeking to argue that institutions in these countries had kept the rent-
seeking cost low as well (for instance, Kim & Ma 1997: 128-30, Chang 1994: 38-45). 
They described a combination of rents and rent-seeking costs in the East Asian 
countries which would have located them near the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 
2.2, in the box marked “developmental state models” in quadrant IV. Differences in 
performance were explained by arguing that the East Asian countries were in this 
region while the typical developing country was in the region identified by 
conventional rent-seeking models in quadrant II. 
 
Paradoxically, both neoclassical and developmental state models stressed low rent-
seeking costs in dynamic economies. We argue that focussing on the rent-seeking cost 
to this extent misrepresents the real location of differences between dynamic and 
stagnant economies. The evidence we will discuss suggests that Asian economies 
were located in the narrow shaded region at the centre of Figure 2.2 marked “Likely 
range of net effects in reality”. The differences in rent-seeking costs across our 
countries were relatively small. On the other hand, the types of rents which they 
sustained were significantly different. Differences in rents can have very substantial 
implications for performance, and a rent-seeking approach which incorporates these 
differences can have significant explanatory power. A failed strategy of learning with 
large, inefficient rents has massively negative implications over time which can dwarf 
the welfare costs of monopolies. On the other hand, rents associated with successful 
learning, innovation or monitoring can have very large positive effects and play a 
critical developmental role. 
 
This shifts attention from the high rent-seeking costs in poor performers (which may 
still be quite high) to their failure to create and maintain socially valuable rents. This 
is important because while both are failures of rent-seeking, the determinants of the 
two failures are different and may suggest different policy responses. Our perspective 
on the relative importance of these two components of the rent-seeking process is 
consistent with the evidence of substantial rent-seeking activities, and in particular of 
corruption, in the successful East Asian industrializers right through their high growth 
period. Their success seems to have been based not on an unusually low level of rent-
seeking, but rather on the creation of value-enhancing rents through their rent-
seeking.  
 
The two components of the rent-seeking process are, in fact, closely interlinked. 
Figure 2.3 shows the inter-dependence of conventional production and rent-seeking 
processes. The existing structure of economic rights (including property rights) is 
shown at the top of the diagram. This determines the incentives governing resource 
allocation between different types of production and rent-seeking activities. The 
allocation of inputs in production results in “final outputs” of goods and services and 
an associated net social benefit. This is the “conventional” production process and is 
shown in the horizontal box with the horizontal arrow. Parallel to the allocation of 
inputs in production, inputs are also being allocated to rent-seeking activities which 
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seek to create, maintain or transfer the rights on which rents are based. The rent-
seeking process is shown in the square box with the vertical arrow. The rent-outcome 
of rent-seeking is either the reproduction of the existing structure of rights or the 
creation of a new one. This is the starting point for a new round of activity.  
Figure 2.3 The Interface of Conventional Production and Rent-Seeking 
 
“Rent-seeking” in Figure 2.3 could describe the narrow activities which seek to create 
monopoly rights but it could also describe activities which create new property rights, 
as in primitive accumulation, or activities which seek to transfer rights, as in subsidies 
to infant industries. This means that we could potentially describe a wide range of 
political economy questions and processes of institutional change within an integrated 
framework of rent-seeking (Samuels and Mercuro 1984). Finally, Figure 2.3 can help 
to clarify how rent-seeking affects the net social benefits associated with final outputs 
(at the right-hand edge of Figure 2.3) through two possible routes which correspond to 
the rent-seeking cost and the rent-outcome effects.  
 
The Rent-Seeking Cost. The first effect of rent-seeking is the loss of final output 
when inputs are transferred downwards (in Figure 2.3) into rent-seeking rather than 
horizontally into production. The input cost of rent-seeking (or the rent-seeking cost) 
associated with a specific rent is the value of net social benefits lost as a result of the 
withdrawal of these inputs from the production of final outputs, holding the structure 
of economic rights constant. Stating it in this way makes it obvious why looking only 
at the rent-seeking cost on its own is unrealistic. If the specific rent-seeking cost we 
are looking at had not been incurred, the structure of rights on which existing 
production is based may also have been different with further effects on final output. 
 
The Value of the Rent-Outcome. The second effect of rent-seeking is the creation, 
maintenance or destruction of some sets of rents. This, in turn has an effect on the 
final net social benefit achieved. We saw in Chapter 1 that changes in the structure of 
rights and rents can have positive or negative effects on net social benefits. The 
difference between the net social benefit with the rights created by a specific type of 
rent-seeking, and the net social benefit which would have obtained without these 
rights, gives us the value of the rent-outcome, holding the rent-seeking cost constant. 
Structures of Rights
Allocations of Inputs (In Production)
Final Outputs and
associated 
Net Social Benefits
(Inputs in Rent-Seeking)
New Structures of Rights
and Rents
(Conventional Production Function)
(The Rent-Outcome)
Determine Incentives
and hence
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This is essentially the net social benefit attributable to specific rents keeping the 
associated input withdrawal due to the rent-seeking constant. The analysis of Chapter 
1 was implicitly doing this. There we had been implicitly holding the rent-seeking 
cost constant by ignoring it! Again, this is unrealistic, because each rent has a specific 
rent-seeking cost, and a different rent would have a different cost. While each of the 
two effects is unrealistic on its own, by combining the two, we get very close to the 
true net effect of a specific rent-seeking process.  
 
Note that any analysis of rent-seeking costs and rent-outcomes only makes sense if we 
are asking questions about a specific part of the rent-seeking process. The more 
narrowly we can define the rents being considered, the more precise the rent-seeking 
analysis. Thus at the most specific level, we could look at the rent-seeking process 
associated with the creation or re-allocation of very specific rights such as a particular 
type of import license. At the broadest level of application, we could look at a limited 
range of rent-seeking in clearly defined sectors, such as the rent-seeking associated 
with policies supporting industrialization in developing countries. This is the level at 
which much of the rent-seeking analysis in this book is carried out. However, it makes 
no sense to ask what the total rent-seeking cost in a society is, or what the structure of 
rights would be in the absence of all rent-seeking. That is a bit like asking what the 
world would look like in the absence of all friction. None of the structures or activities 
which we know may be viable in the absence of all friction, and similarly, no 
institutions and rights might survive if all rent-seeking expenditures really 
disappeared. On the other hand, it does make sense to ask whether there are 
incremental effects when friction increases in particular areas. Similarly, we can try to 
identify the incremental effects on net social benefits if particular rents change as the 
outcome of specific rent-seeking processes, and what the associated rent-seeking costs 
are.  
 
The Two Effects in Production Function Diagrams. Some readers may find a 
diagrammatic representation of the two effects in production functions useful, but 
others may skip the rest of this section. Figure 2.4 looks at rent-seeking in the 
conventional rent-seeking model where rent-seeking sustains a monopolistic rent, say 
based on import controls which protect a domestic producer. The production 
possibility frontier PP for cars and grain shows the combinations of goods the country 
can produce domestically, using all available resources entirely in production. The 
international prices for cars and grain are shown by the slope of the straight price 
lines.  
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P’
A
Cars
Grain XYZ
B’
P
P’ P
B PP is the production possibility frontierA is the efficient output-mix 
B is the output-mix after an import restriction on cars
P’P’ is the frontier after rent-seeking activities
XY is the (negative) social value of the restriction
ZY is the additional rent-seeking cost
 
The value of the monopoly right (which is the rent-outcome in this case) is measured 
as follows. According to standard economic theory, the efficient position for the 
economy given world prices is the point A where the price line is tangential to the 
production frontier. This mix of cars and grain gives the country its highest value of 
final output. The import restriction raises domestic prices for cars (not shown in the 
diagram) and moves domestic production to a point such as B. More cars are 
produced locally, but a lot less grain, and society is worse off. Since inputs are held 
constant, the value of lost final output at world prices (which are assumed to be 
optimal prices) is the lost net social benefit. To compare the value of output at B with 
that at A, we run the world price line through B and compare its level with the  level of 
the price line through A. In Figure 2.4, the lost output is valued at XY when measured 
in grain at world prices. XY is exactly equivalent to the deadweight welfare loss with 
monopoly restrictions measured by the small triangle CDE in Figure 1.3. This is the 
(negative) value of the monopoly right.  
 
 
The early rent-seeking theorists argued that XY underestimates the social cost of the 
monopoly. At B, car producers are earning rents because of the high domestic price of 
cars. Producers who do not enjoy these rents can be expected to attempt to capture 
similar rents by spending resources trying to persuade state officials to create new 
restrictions. Similarly, those who enjoy the restriction may be expected to spend 
resources to ensure that their rents are preserved. These rent-seeking expenditures use 
up resources which could otherwise have been used to produce cars and grain. The 
loss of these inputs from production to rent-seeking results in a shrinkage of the 
production possibility frontier from PP to P’P’. Once this happens, with the same 
restrictions, the economy produces at a point such as B’. The location of the new 
Figure 2.4 The Net Effect of Rent-Seeking with Value-Reducing Rents 
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position has no necessary relationship with B, except that it is on a lower production 
possibility frontier. 
 
We can now put a notional input cost on the rent-seeking. Comparing the value of 
output at B', which is the final output after inputs have been lost to rent-seeking, with 
the value of final output at B without the input withdrawal gives us the rent-seeking 
cost. Measured in grain at international prices, the rent-seeking cost is ZY. The net 
effect of the rent-seeking process is thus XZ. Of this XY is the value of the rent 
created by the rent-seeking (the rent-outcome) which is typically ignored in the 
standard rent-seeking analysis because it is relatively small and because economists 
already know about it. The rent-seeking cost, ZY, is subtracted from this (increasing 
the negative benefit for society) to give XZ, the net effect of the rent-seeking process. 
Note that the sequence of events in this exposition is a notional one. The input 
withdrawal due to rent-seeking activities and the monopoly rent created through this 
rent-seeking are typically simultaneous events. 
 
Figure 2. 5 The Net Effects of Rent-Seeking with Value-Enhancing Rents 
 
The importance of distinguishing between the inputs and rent-outcomes of rent-
seeking can be seen by considering an example where rent-seeking is associated with 
the creation of socially beneficial rents. In the last example, the restriction induced 
greater car production but had no effect on technology. Figure 2.5 shows a case where 
the restriction induces “learning” by the car producer. If the state is able to ensure that 
the rent earned by the domestic producer is for a limited period and subject to learning 
taking place, the result may be a movement outward of the domestic production 
function. This is equivalent to the successful learning case discussed in Chapter 1. If 
P’
A
Cars
Grain X YZ
B’
P
P’’
P
B
PP is the initial production possibility frontier
A is the efficient output-mix  
P''P'' is the frontier after import restrictions induce learning
B is the output-mix after the restriction
P'P' is the frontier with rent-seeking
B’ is the output-mix after rent-seeking
XY is the potential social value of the restriction
ZY is the rent-seeking cost
P’ P’’
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the subsidy is successful in inducing learning, the rent creation would result in a 
movement outward of the production possibility curve in the first instance. 
 
Our starting point is once again point A on the initial production possibility frontier 
PP. The effect of the learning induced by the rent is to move the production possibility 
curve out to P''P''. As a result, the economy could potentially move to point B. This 
part of the story is based on the analysis of Chapter 1 and ignores any rent-seeking 
which may be associated with the management of this rent. Rent-seeking expenditures 
may have an effect which is equivalent to a lowering of the production possibility 
frontier such that it reaches only P'P' instead of P''P''. Actual production is at a point 
such as B' rather than B because of this rent-seeking cost. 
  
 
The overall effect is therefore composed of a rent-seeking cost ZY, which is negative 
as before, and a potential social benefit of XY due to the induced learning, which in 
this case is positive. In this case, the net effect of the rent-seeking process is a net 
benefit of XZ given by XY-ZY. Splitting the move from A to B’ into two parts is 
analytically convenient but in fact, once again, the two moves happen simultaneously. 
In the general case, where either value-enhancing or value-reducing rights may be 
created, the evaluation of both components of the rent-seeking process is clearly 
important.  
 
2.2 Rent-seeking: The Evidence  
 
Table 2.1 shows GDP and industrial growth rates for several Asian economies over 
their three decades of high growth culminating in the financial crisis of 1997-8. We 
are not suggesting that all of the difference in performance can be explained in terms 
of any single model. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask whether differences in processes 
of rent-seeking could account for at least part of their differences in performance. To 
answer this question, we draw on the existing literature to summarize some of the 
evidence on rent-seeking in the industrial sectors in the Indian subcontinent, 
Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand, and ask whether the input or rent-outcome 
dimensions of rent-seeking can explain performance differentials. 
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(Industrial Growth Rates in Brackets)
BANGLADESH INDIA PAKISTAN SOUTH KOREA MALAYSIA THAILAND
1970-80 2.3 3.4 4.9 9.6 7.9 7.1
(5.2) (4.5) (6.1) (15.2) - (9.5)
1980-90 4.3 5.8 6.3
(7.3)(4.9) (7.1)
9.5
(12.1)
5.2
(7.2)
7.6
(9.9)
1990-97 4.5
(6.8)
5.9
(7.1)
4.4
(5.5)
7.2
(7.5)
8.7
(11.2)
7.5
(10.3)
-5.0 -7.0-6.01998 e - 5.0 5.4
Subjective Corruption Indices
1980-83 4.0 5.3 4.0 5.7 6.0 1.5
1996 2.3 2.6 1.0 5.0 5.3 3.3
Sources: World Bank (1994; 1998/9). 1998 growth figures are estimates and 1999 figures are
predictions: Asian Development Bank. Corruption Indices from Mauro (1995); Bardhan (1997). 
A corruption index of 10 indicates minimum corruption, 0 indicates maximum corruption.
-1.0  0.5-2.01999 p - 5.2 4.3
 
 
Rent-Seeking Costs. In terms of final outputs, the relatively poor performance of the 
Indian subcontinent compared to the East Asian countries is shown by the relative 
growth rates of GDP and industrial output in Table 2.1. To what extent can this be 
explained by differences in the input cost of rent-seeking across countries? In the past, 
following Krueger (1974), rent-seeking theorists have attempted to calculate the input 
cost of rent-seeking as a percentage of GDP. The input cost is difficult to compute 
directly because rent-seeking expenditures can take a variety of forms, including 
expenditures on corruption, lobbying and political contributions. For reasons which 
will become clear after Section 2.4 where we discuss the theoretical determinants of 
the input costs of rent-seeking, we do not believe that these costs can be indirectly 
deduced by measuring the total rents in the economy, the method followed by 
Krueger and her followers. Instead, we will argue that a precise measure of the rent-
seeking cost as a share of GDP is not absolutely necessary. We will rely on statistical, 
journalistic and academic evidence to give the reader a feel for the substantial amount 
of rent-seeking expenditures in all these countries to argue that differences in these 
expenditures are not likely to be of a sufficient magnitude to explain the substantial 
differences in performance.  
 
The evidence on corruption in Table 2.1 refers largely to the industrial sector where 
foreign business was mostly involved. It suggests that these countries all suffered 
significantly from corruption in the key period of the seventies and eighties. The 
Business International index for corruption in 1980-83 (on a scale from 0 for 
maximum corruption to 10 for no corruption) was 5.25 for India, 5.7 for South Korea 
Table 2.1 GDP and Industrial Growth Rates and Corruption Indicators in some Asian Countries 
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and 6 for Malaysia (Mauro 1995). Given the crudity of these subjective indices, these 
differences are not very significant. Thailand, on the other hand, had a very high 
corruption index of 1.5 for this period, suggesting a combination of large and 
widespread bribes faced by prospective businessmen, and yet it was a high-growth 
economy prior to 1997. 
 
According to this index, by the mid-nineties corruption had increased in most of these 
countries. The only exception was Thailand which was the most corrupt country in the 
group in the eighties, but by the nineties was less corrupt than the South Asian 
countries. Yet despite this improvement, Thailand led the East Asian countries into 
the financial crisis of 1997. At the same time, the most significant increase in 
corruption in the nineties was in the South Asian countries, but paradoxically they 
suffered hardly at all from the financial crisis of 1997. To the extent that the 
corruption index is trustworthy, it corroborates other evidence which suggests that the 
1997 financial crisis had specific causes which should not be confused with our long-
run assessment of the implications of corruption and rent-seeking in these countries.  
 
The publication of subjective indices of corruption should not lead us to ignore other 
types of rent-seeking expenditures, in particular expenditures on lobbying and on 
political “contributions”. In all these countries, the role of the state was substantial 
even though the types of intervention were different. Lobbying and “shoe- leather” 
costs in overcoming red-tape affected them all, though here too, there were some 
differences. The Indian subcontinent has long been recognized as having some of the 
most oppressive red-tape in Asia (see Little, Skitovsky and Scott 1970). But there 
were significant red-tape and lobbying costs in the other countries as well, though 
they are difficult to rank. Finally, contributions to political factions were an important 
rent-seeking cost in all these countries and will be further discussed in our next 
section. 
 
Looking at each of our countries in turn, the Indian evidence suggests that rent-
seeking expenditures had a rising trend over the sixties and seventies, as the intensity 
of rent-seeking contests increased (Bardhan 1984; Ahluwalia 1985). Expenditures on 
political factions were a significant component which grew from the mid-sixties 
onwards, a trend which is further discussed in our next section. Liberalization, which 
began in earnest in the late eighties, does not seem to have resulted in a reduction in 
the most blatant forms of rent-seeking expenditures in India (Harriss-White 1996). 
Liberalization probably did result in a reduction in the burning of shoe- leather 
required to work around the labyrinthine industrial licensing system. On the other 
hand, it had ambiguous effects on corruption and on political contributions, which 
may actually have increased.  As far as subjective perceptions of corruption go, Table 
2.1 suggests that there was a significant increase in corruption in the Indian 
subcontinent in the nineties following liberalization.  
 
While corruption probably did increase over this period, there was also a much greater 
public perception of corruption, fuelled by legal proceedings against highly placed 
politicians. Rajiv Gandhi was accused in the late eighties of covering up kickbacks to 
his party from Bofors of Sweden which was granted a contract to supply arms to the 
Indian army. In late 1995, thirty or so politicians, including several cabinet ministers 
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of the succeeding Rao government, were implicated in a corruption scandal involving 
20 million US dollars over a period of two years. Although the sum involved was 
small, the case became politically important as an indicator of widespread kickbacks 
from businessmen to political faction leaders. Following Prime Minister Rao's fall 
from office in 1996, he too was charged with corruption and arrested. Soon 
afterwards, a number of lesser Indian politicians were implicated in corruption 
scandals, including, most notably, the Chief Minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, 
who was forced to resign in mid-1997.  
 
In South Korea, the evidence suggests that corruption was high throughout the high 
growth period following the Park Chung Hee coup of 1961 (Kong 1996). Although 
there has been a tendency amongst some rent-seeking analysts to portray the South 
Korean state as relatively clean, observers of South Korean industrial policy have 
pointed out the coexistence of efficiency with corruption (Amsden 1989: 15, 73). 
Hard evidence of the scale of corruption in South Korea has begun to emerge only 
recently, particularly with the admission in 1995 by ex-President Roh Tae Woo of his 
personal accumulation of around 650 million US dollars during his five year period in 
office (Khan 1996a; 1996b). Like Prime Minister Rao in India, President Roh of 
South Korea was eventually arrested on charges of corruption, and almost all the large 
chaebol were publicly named as having been involved in kickbacks to the regime. 
Again, the subjective perception of corruption in Table 2.1 suggests a worsening of 
corruption in South Korea in the nineties, when liberalization began in earnest. 
Nevertheless, the perception of international businessmen was that corruption had 
worsened much more significantly in the Indian subcontinent. However, the 
difference in the degree of corruption in these countries was less significant in the 
eighties when the performance differential between them was most significant. 
Moreover, in the nineties, when India suffered a catastrophic increase in corruption, 
South Korea and the East Asian NICs suffered most severely from the financial crisis. 
 
The efficiency of the South Korean industrial policy regime meant that little attention 
has been given in the literature to the costs of lobbying in South Korea. But we do 
know that industry associations had to spend a lot of time in consultations with 
government. This was clearly a rent-seeking input, but in contrast to Ind ia and many 
other developing countries, the outcome of the lobbying in South Korea was, on the 
whole, productive. Nevertheless, lobbying in South Korea must have involved real 
and substantial input costs. In addition, there were also contributions to political 
parties and factions, but they were incorporated in the payoffs going to the top man as 
a result of the centralization of the political establishment in this period. Thus, payoffs 
going to President Roh from the chaebol were partly used to fund his own political 
campaign, partly to fund the campaigns of his opponents (Kim Dae Jung, his arch-
rival admitted that he received part of the money!) and even to provide performance 
related kickbacks to bureaucrats.  
 
The Malaysian evidence suggests that corruption was substantial throughout its period 
of high growth in the seventies (Jomo 1986: 243-72). However, compared to the other 
countries, Malaysia receives a relatively clean report from international business in its 
subjective corruption index. We will suggest a possible explanation for this in our 
next section. While journalistic evidence of cases of corruption involving top 
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politicians has not come to the fore as much as in India and South Korea, scandals 
involving kickbacks from major construction projects such as dams have attracted 
international attention because they involved western governments and companies. In 
the eighties, evidence of political contributions from business to political factions 
increased, as factions within the ruling party developed contacts and kickback 
arrangements, particularly with Chinese business (Jomo and Gomez, this volume). 
Liberalization probably contributed to the worsening of corruption in the nineties, as 
indicated by the subjective corruption index in Table 2.1. Lobbying by business is less 
widely discussed in Malaysia, perhaps because the state was, for a time, less 
accessible for domestic capitalists compared to India or South Korea. Political 
contributions were also centralized during this period, as we will see in our next 
section, which kept them moderate compared to the Indian subcontinent. 
 
In Thailand, the high degree of corruption of political leaders has been well known for 
some time. In 1973, when Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn fell, the subsequent 
government was actually able to seize assets equivalent to 140 million US dollars 
(Phongpaichit & Baker 1997: 287). If anything, the magnitude of the bribes collected 
by the top leaders has gone up over time despite a long history of new governments 
attacking the  corrupt politicians of the previous regime. In addition, corruption has 
become more democratic over time, with a growing number of political factions 
participating in “money politics”. The distinctive feature of Thailand from the 
seventies onwards was tha t a large number of these factions were controlled by 
emerging capitalists, a feature which we will see in Section 2.3 was of some 
significance (see also Sidel 1996). While the corruption figures in Table 2.1 suggest 
some decline in the corruption faced by foreign business over time, the political 
evidence which we will later discuss suggests that “money politics” and expenditures 
on political factions increased significantly since the mid-seventies. 
 
While rent-seeking was widespread in all these countries, this does not mean that the 
expenditures on rent-seeking in absolute terms or as a share of GDP or industrial 
value added were the same. A subjective assessment of the balance of evidence 
suggests that over the seventies and eighties, relative rent-seeking expenditures were 
greatest in the Indian subcontinent and Thailand, less so in Malaysia, and least in 
South Korea. However, since even Malaysia and South Korea had very interventionist 
states over this period, with substantial corruption and political contributions, the 
differences in the share of rent-seeking expenditures in GDP are likely to have been 
relatively small.  
 
How large would differences in rent-seeking costs have to be, to explain a significant 
part of the differences in performance? In Table 2.1, we see that in the seventies, the 
difference in industrial growth rates between India and South Korea was around ten 
per cent per annum, falling to five per cent in the eighties. No one suggests that this 
can be entirely due to differences in rent-seeking costs, but it is instructive to ask how 
large these differences would have to be to explain such performance differentials. 
The incremental capital-output ratio in Indian industry was around 8 in the seventies 
and 14 in the eighties (Chakravarty 1987: 105). Thus for Indian industry to have 
grown 10 per cent faster in the seventies, it would have had to invest 80 per cent more 
of industrial value added in the seventies; and for it to have grown 5 per cent faster in 
  
17 
the eighties, it would have had to invest 70 per cent more of its industrial value added. 
Thus, to explain the growth differential in terms of rent-seeking costs, we would have 
to argue that rent-seeking in Indian industry absorbed 70 to 80 per cent of its 
industrial value added which would otherwise have been invested on top of the share 
lost to rent-seeking in South Korea. From the qualitative evidence we have looked at 
so far, this amount of additional rent-seeking in India is not credible. This is another 
way of saying that the productivity of investment matters. The productivity of 
investment is not entirely independent of the rent-seeking process, since differences in 
the types of rents have important implications for the productivity of investments. 
 
Rent-outcomes. The outcomes of rent-seeking have varied much more significantly 
across our countries. The industrial policy structure which emerged in South Korea in 
the early sixties is now well known (Amsden 1989; Chang 1994; Kim & Ma 1997). 
Rents for learning were created using state subsidies. But in South Korea, effective 
performance monitoring ensured that subsidy-recipients did in fact move up the 
technology ladder and the learning rents (see Chapter 1) were significantly value-
enhancing. In contrast, in the Indian subcontinent, indus trial policy in the sixties also 
aimed to promote strategic sectors but the results were less impressive. Licensing of 
production sought to use entry barriers to create rents for infant industries and to 
encourage the adoption of new technologies. However, performance monitoring was 
much weaker, in fact virtually non-existent, and the rights which created rents were 
not, or could not be, reallocated when performance lagged (Ahluwalia 1985). A 
significant part of Indian rent-creation was of value-reducing redistributive rents for 
competing factions based on caste, community, language and party which are 
discussed further in our next section. These differences in rent-outcomes can 
potentially explain substantial differences in growth rates. 
 
By the eighties, important changes began to emerge in both countries. Both India and 
South Korea embarked on liberalization strategies in the mid-eighties, which marked 
an important shift in the types of rights and rents which both economies had been 
supporting in the past. In India, the immediate effects of liberalization were positive 
given the poor performance of previous statist policies. In contrast, in South Korea, 
liberalization, particularly of the financial sector, marked a break with previously 
successful  industrial policy (Chang, Park and Yoo 1998). It is arguable that industrial 
policy of the old type was no longer feasible given technological and social 
developments in South Korea. We will come back to this debate later. What is clear is 
the South Korean industrial performance declined in the liberalization phase as 
learning rents and the industrial policy structure were progressively abandoned. 
 
The Malaysian story in the seventies and eighties is different from both the South 
Korean and Indian ones. The most distinctive feature here was the creation of 
redistributive rents for ethnic Malays based primarily on transfers from the Chinese-
Malaysian business sector. Transfers on this scale should have had negative incentive 
effects, but in fact, despite some dampening of confidence, Chinese-Malaysian 
capitalists continued to drive the domestic industrial sector (Jomo and Gomez, this 
volume). In addition, the public enterprises set up to create jobs for Malays were often 
reasonably competent recipients of learning rents, though monitoring of subsidies was 
substantially weaker than in South Korea. Finally, an important component of 
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Malaysian rent-seeking was the insulation of multinationals from domestic 
redistribution. The confidence of multinationals explains the large inflow of capital 
and technology in the seventies, and again since the late eighties, till the financial 
crisis of 1997 temporarily halted this process.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Rent-Seeking Processes in Asian Industry in the Seventies and Eighties 
 
The Thai rent-outcomes were different again. Thai rent-seeking resulted in 
redistributive transfers to capitalists, but unlike South Korea, here these transfers 
mainly supported primitive accumulation rather than being learning rents. More 
significantly, the rent-seeking in Thailand was very competitive and repeatedly 
resulted in entry into rent-earning industrial sectors by excluded capitalists (Doner & 
Ramsay; Rock, this volume). Fortunately for Thailand, the relatively basic technology 
in most of its industrial sectors did not require learning and monitoring rents for their 
adoption or efficient operation. As a result, rapid entry and rent dissipation of 
monopoly rents turned out to be value-enhancing. On the other hand, the unplanned 
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and almost anarchic nature of Thai rent-seeking undoubtedly had a role to play in 
explaining the gradual adoption of unsustainable capital account policies which 
precipitated the 1997 financial crisis. 
 
Based on our discussion so far, Figure 2.6 summarizes some aspects of the inputs and 
rent-outcomes of rent-seeking in these countries, focussing on the industrial sector in 
the high growth period of the seventies and eighties. Differences between our 
countries in terms of rent-outcomes were significant. We saw in Chapter 1 that these 
differences may be associated with very large differences in growth rates and thus 
explain a significant part of their differences in performance. In comparison, 
differences in the scale of their rent-seeking expenditures appear to be less significant. 
This does not mean that differences in rent-seeking costs were not important, but it 
does mean that policy and analytical attention has to be re-oriented. 
 
2.3 Patron-client Networks and the Organization of Rent-seeking  
 
So far we have looked at the types of rents and the associated rent-seeking costs in our 
countries. We now look at what we know about who was engaged in rent-seeking and 
how this rent-seeking was organized. In developing countries, a significant part of the 
rent-seeking cost is spent within patron-client networks and the rents produced as a 
result are also often distributed within these networks. A study of the resource flows 
within these networks is thus a very useful way of mapping differences in the 
organization of rent-seeking across countries. On the one hand, a large part of the total 
inputs used in rent-seeking are often spent within these networks. Some of these 
expenditures are legal, such as election expenditures or payments to party officials, 
but large parts are illegal or quasi- legal, such as payoffs to mafia bosses, payoffs to 
members of factions to retain their allegiance, illegal election expenditures, and so on. 
Collectively, these inputs maintain the organizational power of patrons, which is often 
critical for winning rent-seeking contests. At the same time, a large part of the rents 
which are the outcomes of rent-seeking are likely to be created for key members or 
constituencies within these networks. Thus, there is likely to be a “circular flow” 
whereby part of the income from rents created for patrons as rent-outcomes in one 
period provide the resources for inputs of rent-seeking expenditures on clients in the 
next period. This sustains their organizational power and allows further rounds of 
rent-seeking. These flows of resources therefore give us very useful information about 
differences in the organization of rent-seeking across countries.  
 
This section looks at patterns of resource flows in our target countries based on a 
reading of their economic and political histories. We focus on those features of 
patron-client relationships in each country which are particularly relevant for our 
subsequent comparative analysis of rent-seeking. From the perspective of our 
subsequent analysis, we will be particularly interested in the distribution of 
organizational power within these countries. A comparative approach is very 
important because it directs our attention at an abstract level to what is different 
between countries. Looking only at one country often prevents such an understanding 
because to some degree all types of organizations and types of rent-seeking can be 
found in every country. What is important is that the relative importance of different 
processes can be significantly different and the comparative approach allows us to 
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focus on what is distinctive in each country. We focus on the industrial sectors in our 
countries over the sixties, seventies and eighties. We also touch on the likely changes 
in flows within networks and in the underlying distribution of power in the nineties, to 
see how the organization of rent-seeking was changing over time. 
 
The Indian Subcontinent. Despite important differences between India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, there are many similarities in the predominant ways in which rents are 
sought in these countries. They each have a very large number of factional groups 
which compete for redistributive rents. And in each case, members of the 
“intermediate” or “middle” classes play a key organizational and leadership role 
within these factions. The intermediate classes are, in the main, the educated sections 
of the population, both employed and unemployed, and the richer peasants whose 
sons and daughters provide new entrants into the educated classes through the 
universities and colleges. While capitalists and land lords may, as individuals, control 
significant resources, they are too few in number to control the political process by 
themselves. In contrast, the middle and lower middle classes have the organizational 
power to dominate politics. 
 
The composition of the group of classes providing political and organizational 
leadership varies across regions in the subcontinent. But, by and large, the groups 
which dominate organizational politics are neither capitalists nor landlords in the 
conventional sense, nor are they from working class or poor peasant backgrounds. 
While their social origins vary, they typically occupy an “intermediate” position in 
society. Some Indian political economists have singled out professionals (white collar 
workers) as playing a distinctive role in Indian rent-seeking. For instance, Bardhan 
(1984) identifies professionals as one of the three classes forming the coalition of 
dominant classes in India, together with capitalists and landlords. Professionals are a 
subset of the intermediate classes; they have high levels of education and therefore 
have more privileged positions in the job market. But professionals are not the only 
members of the intermediate classes. Less well-educated lower middle class groups 
such as unemployed college graduates, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and richer 
peasants in the villages have substantial organizational power and play a key role in 
the competition for redistributive rents. We include all these groups in our category of 
the “intermediate” classes. 
 
The roots of the role played by the intermediate classes goes back at least to British 
colonial times, if not earlier. The British in India were so few in number that they 
could only have ruled with the complicity of Indian classes and groups which had the 
power to challenge them. These groups included, in the first instance, landed elites 
and later members of the emerging “middle class”, both of which became key players 
in the colonial polity. The strategy of the colonial state was to exploit divisions among 
these groups and indeed to create new divisions. The object of this exercise was to 
ensure that claims and counterclaims over resources were finely balanced so that the 
state had to deal with a small number of malcontents at any one time. On the other 
hand, because redistributions were based on organizational power, there were big 
potential gains for factions with organizational power. Given the weakness of the 
productive classes, organizational power involved the construction of cross-class 
alliances led by political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes. As a result, 
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linguistic, religious and caste organizations proliferated. The lion's share of the 
redistributive rents were, of course, captured by the political entrepreneurs but to 
mobilize large numbers, at least some of the rents had to be distributed down the 
factional networks. 
 
Subsequent economic and political developments further strengthened the 
intermediate classes. The deepening of democratic aspirations and demographic 
growth strengthened these groups both numerically and politically. Most political 
scientists agree that factional politics intensified in India after the mid-sixties (see, for 
instance, Rudolph & Rudolph 1987). A similar intensification also happened in 
Pakistan and later Bangladesh at about the same time despite the presence of military 
governments in the sixties and again in the late seventies and early eighties (Khan 
1989). As the intermediate classes grew in strength, the numbers of factions and 
competing ideological identities also increased. New ethnic, religious and caste 
groups entered the political arena. This pattern of politics has not enriched the vast 
majority of the populations of these countries, but has enabled successive layers of 
emerging middle class groups to get access to rents on the basis of their ability to 
organize the much more numerous groups below them.  
 
One of the distinctive features of rent-seeking in the Indian subcontinent is that the 
number of competing factions has always been large, and moreover, since the sixties, 
has been rapidly growing. An important consequence of this was that for anyone with 
resources to spare, organizational power in the form of “unemployed” factions could 
be cheaply purchased. This explains why emerging industrial capitalists (and in the 
countryside, rich landlords) have found it so easy to contribute to factions which 
could provide them with additional political muscle. This in turn has allowed 
capitalists and others to seek and protect redistributive rents. The excess supply of 
organizational power and the fragmented nature of factions helps to explain the dense 
structure of interlinked economic and political exchanges within patron-client 
networks in the Indian subcontinent. This interlocking of economic and political 
exchanges in Indian corruption was identified by (amongst others) Wade (1984; 1985; 
1989).  
 
Figure 2.7 shows the complexity of the flows of resources between the state, 
capitalists and political organizers in the Indian subcontinent which we will later 
compare with our other countries. In these diagrams, bureaucrats (B) and politicians 
(P) are shown as two parallel hierarchies within the state. For simplicity, Figure 2.7 
only distinguishes between two social groups, capitalists (C) and non-capitalists (N), 
the latter being led in the main by the intermediate classes discussed earlier. However, 
successful non-capitalist organizers can often become political leaders or even 
capitalists over time.  
 
The cross-cutting patron-client resource flows in the Indian subcontinent can be 
described as fragmented clientelism. There are a large number of competing patrons 
supporting non-capitalist clients (the arrows from P to N). These flows are, in the first 
instance, resources which political entrepreneurs spend as rent-seeking inputs to buy 
organizational power. The quid pro quo for these patrons is a reverse flow of political 
and organizational support from clients. Since this is not an economic flow, it is not 
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shown in Figure 2.7, but the organizational power which patrons mobilize in this way 
plays a critical role in the rent-seeking process in these countries. When this type of 
rent-seeking is successful, redistributive transfer rents for factions are created as an 
outcome shown by flows of resources typically funded by transfers from the state. 
These rents can benefit different constituencies and are shown in the diagram as a 
number of flows: from B to N (when transfer rents are created for non-capitalist 
constituencies), from B to C, (when transfer rents are created for capitalists), and from 
B to P, (when political leaders directly gain control over budgets which they can 
allocate to their constituencies). 
 
Figure 2. 7 Resource Flows in Patron-Client Networks: The Indian Subcontinent 
 
This fragmented clientelism has important implications for rent-outcomes in industry. 
Like capitalists in other countries, Indian capitalists have engaged in straightforward 
rent-seeking. They have spent resources on politicians and bureaucrats (the arrows 
from C to P and from C to B) in the form of inputs going into lobbying and bribes. 
When this rent-seeking has been successful, the rent-outcome for capitalists has taken 
the form of transfers sustaining primitive accumulation, monopoly rents protecting 
particular producers or ostensible learning rents (all shown by the arrows from B to 
C).  
 
But apart from this standard type of rent-seeking, capitalists in the Indian 
subcontinent have also engaged in “political” rent-seeking. Given the excess supply of 
organizational power, capitalists have  spent rent-seeking inputs purchasing political 
organizers (the arrows from C to N and from C to P), and thus organizational power 
and “protection”. These inputs gave individual capitalists the political power to 
protect their rents. The rent-outcome of this type of rent-seeking was the political 
protection of rents which had an important but subtle effect. The purchase of factional 
political power by capitalists made it difficult for the state to manage rents for 
learning efficiently. Subsidies had to be granted to capitalists attached to powerful 
factions and could not be withdrawn once granted. This ensured that rents which were 
ostensibly learning rents for infant industries were effectively converted into 
monopoly rents for protected capitalists. Subsidies for poorly performing industries 
and sectors persisted despite common knowledge of their performance failures (Khan 
1989). Although the Philippines has a very different social history, with the oligarchs 
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rather than the intermediate classes playing leadership roles, Hutchcroft's analysis of 
patron-client flows in the Philippines (this volume) has interesting parallels with 
India's fragmented clientelism. 
 
The experiment with liberalization in the Indian subcontinent in the eighties and 
nineties has to be seen in this context. By reducing the amount of subsidy up for 
grabs, the supporters of liberalization hoped to drive out redistributive factions, and 
eventually the blocking effect these played in processes of structural change. The 
likely outcome of this strategy is still in the balance. There is no evidence yet that 
redistributive politics has been effectively curtailed. Much of the early success of 
liberalization has been due to a boom in the demand for consumer durables rather than 
a decline in redistributive politics. It is only if the latter is achieved that liberalization 
would change the pattern of rent-seeking in India in the long run (Harriss-White 1996; 
Khan 1996a). The limited evidence on corruption suggests that redistributive demands 
may actually have increased driven by more intense conflicts over resources (see the 
corruption indices in Table 2.1).  
 
South Korea. South Korea during the sixties and seventies presents a very different 
configuration of patron-client flows. In contrast to the complexity of the flows we see 
in the subcontinent, the predominant patron-client flows in South Korea were more 
coordinated. The South Korean state enjoyed much greater political power relative to 
its constituents and its executive leadership could deal with political contestants in a 
much more centralized way. At the same time, non-capitalist political organizers seem 
to have been much weaker compared to the Indian subcontinent. This allowed patrons 
located within the South Korean state to enjoy a higher degree of autonomy from 
competing demands in society (Jones & Sakong 1980; Mason et. al. 1980; Amsden 
1989; Kim 1994: 59-70; Kong 1996; Kim & Ma 1997). In Figure 2.8 we exclude non-
capitalist political organizers entirely, not because they were completely absent, but 
because they did not play a decisive role in the process of rent creation and allocation 
at this time. 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the most important flows associated with rent-seeking in South 
Korea during its industrial policy phase (Amsden 1989; Khan 1989; Chang 1994; Kim 
& Ma 1997). The most important rent-outcome during this period was the transfer of 
resources from the state’s bureaucratic apparatus (B) to emerging capitalists (C). 
Initially, these transfers were simply transfer rents supporting primitive accumulation, 
for instance, when abandoned Japanese assets were “privatized”. Later, these transfers 
took the form of learning rents for emerging capitalists. South Korea was one of the 
most successful countries attempting to catch up using rents fo r learning in the sixties 
and seventies. At the same time, substantial rent-seeking costs on the input side were 
associated with these transfers. We now know that there were substantial rent-seeking 
inputs in the form of kickbacks from the favoured industrial groups (C) to the political 
leadership (P) and through them to bureaucrats (B) as well (Kong 1996; Khan 1996a; 
1996b). These revelations emerged during the corruption cases of the nineties, but 
they referred to the sharing of bribes between top politic ians and bureaucrats in the 
seventies and eighties. 
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Figure 2. 8 Resource Flows in Patron-Client Networks: South Korea in the Seventies 
 
 
The key difference of the South Korean rent-seeking process from that in the Indian 
subcontinent was the absence of decentralized centres of organizational and political 
power which had the ability to effectively demand or protect redistributive rents. This 
had important consequences for rent-outcomes in that transfers organized as learning 
rents could generate growth because the central leadership of the state could use a 
carrot-and-stick strategy to induce learning but not allow feather-bedding. The 
distribution of organizational power in South Korea prevented individuals unrelated to 
industrial policy from offering to protect the rents of emerging capitalists 
independently of the interests and calculations of the political leadership (Woo-
Cumings 1997).  
 
The absence of a large number of redistributive groups led by a powerful intermediate 
class can in turn be traced to Korea's social history and the nature of the Japanese 
colonial impact (Kohli 1994). The Japanese, unlike the British, did not rule through 
the creation of supporters and administrators within the local population. Instead, they 
relied to a much greater extent on Japanese colonial administrators. This had much to 
do with Japan’s geographical proximity and its demographic dominance over its 
colonies, as well as perhaps to differences in colonial ideology. The British in India 
could not have fielded the same number of troops and administrators relative to the 
domestic population. Consequently, its colonial strategy was significantly different. In 
contrast, the Japanese colonial state could carry out far-reaching social changes from 
above, often with great harshness. Japanese land reforms and confiscations destroyed 
the power base of the landed elite. It transferred between a quarter and a third of 
arable land to Japanese entrepreneurs and corporations (Kohli 1994: 1277-9). But at 
the same time, considerable investments in industry and agriculture created 
employment opportunities in the productive sector, rapidly changing the structure of 
the economy. 
 
In contrast to the British in their far- flung colonies, the Japanese goal in its 
neighbouring colonies seems not to have been to extract a few resources and maintain 
a captive market at the lowest cost. Instead, they aimed to convert Korea into a 
productive base for Japan and eventually to absorb it totally (Kohli 1994: 1272-4). 
Accommodating landlords, urban professionals and middle classes formed no part of 
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this plan, and the organizational power and legitimacy of intermediate groups never 
developed to the same extent. To say that South Korean industrial policy eventually 
benefited from this social history is not to deny the importance of the leadership role 
of Park Chung-Hee, nor the importance of the institutions under which rents for 
learning were administered during the industrial policy phase. However, similar 
institutional attempts to discipline recipients of learning rents failed in other countries, 
such as Pakistan in the sixties, which did not have this social history (see, for instance, 
Khan 1999).  
 
The pattern of South Korean rent flows shown in Figure 2.8 did change over time. 
Rapid economic development eventually created a large middle class which, by the 
mid-eighties, became increasingly unwilling to accept the high-handed way in which 
resources were being allocated by the state. Not surprisingly, by the early nineties, 
revelations of corruption increased dramatically, even though much of this referred to 
the efficient rent-creation period of the sixties and seventies. The evidence suggests 
that the pattern of corruption was also changing by the nineties. Evidence of value-
reducing interlocking between political factions and capitalists along the Indian 
pattern begins to emerge. Thus, in 1997, the steel  company Hanbo went bankrupt 
amidst allegations that it had continued to receive state support long after its poor 
economic performance had become well-known. Factions within President Kim 
Young Sam’s party and one of his sons were implicated in supporting these subsidies. 
In the same year, Kim Young Sam’s finance minister seems to have supported a 
takeover of the automobile operations of the Kia conglomerate by its competitor 
Samsung, a strategy which many observers felt was motivated by political rather than 
economic considerations. The minister was closely associated with Samsung, and the 
company had also invested heavily in President Kim’s home town of Pusan. These 
and other revelations led to a decline of domestic and international confidence in 
industrial policy well before the financial crisis of 1997.  
 
Chang, Park & Yoo (1998) argue that these examples of efficiency-reducing 
corruption in South Korea were not typical of industrial policy in that country. They 
subscribe to the view that the gradual abandonment of industrial policy in the nineties 
and the shift towards liberalization was a policy decision which was not driven by any 
change in the viability of old-style industrial policy. They may be right, but it may 
also be that by the nineties, real changes were taking place in the distribution of 
political power in South Korea which allowed rent-recipients to form political 
alliances to protect their rents in ways which had not been possible earlier. The 
growing technical sophistication of South Korean industry was undoubtedly also 
making the allocation of learning rents more difficult, since bureaucrats were less and 
less competent to judge performance. The shift towards liberalization in South Korea 
may well have been driven, at least in part, by a recognition within the state that 
efficient rents for learning could no longer be effectively managed. This does not 
mean that liberalization of the type selected was the only or the best response. 
Constructing the institutions and political alignments to manage learning rents when 
political power is fragmented is a challenge for all developing countries. For 
relatively advanced countries like South Korea, which are operating close to the 
technical frontier on many (but by no means all) fronts and have exhausted easy 
learning opportunities, the challenge is more daunting. Here, the challenge is also to 
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construct new institutions for managing Schumpeterian innovation rents in addition to 
learning rents. 
 
Malaysia. The South-East Asian countries were located somewhere between South 
Korea and the Indian subcontinent in terms of the relative organizational power of 
their intermediate classes. They did not experience the draconian colonialism and 
social engineering which South Korea and Taiwan suffered under the Japanese (Kohli 
1994). On the other hand, although their colonial experience was closer to that of the 
Indian subcontinent, in most cases they had a shorter colonial history and the 
development and accommodation of the intermediate classes was less advanced. 
Indeed in the case of Thailand, there had never been direct colonial rule. 
 
As in the Indian subcontinent, post- independence Malaysia faced redistributive 
demands from its own intermediate classes. However, here, a centralized pattern of 
resource flows emerged in response to these demands which proved to be compatible 
with rapid growth. Paradoxically, the ethnic divide in Malaysia between its largely 
Chinese-Malaysian capitalists and the predominantly Malay population allowed this 
centralized redistribution to emerge. The political isolation of the Chinese capitalists 
allowed them to be effectively “taxed” in a centralized way for the benefit of 
emerging intermediate groups. Moreover, since the bulk of the transfer could be legal, 
the need for illegal exactions was far less. This is probably an important reason why 
Malaysia was the least corrupt of the countries in Table 2.1. If, instead of the ethnic 
argument, a purely welfarist argument for transfers had been used, it would probably 
not have allowed the same pattern of centralized transfers. Welfarist transfers would 
have gone to the poorest groups in Malaysia, and not to the politically powerful 
Malay middle class, and would not serve the political purpose of accommodating the 
organizationally powerful. The ethnic and religious diversity of intermediate groups 
in India is one reason why it has been so difficult to construct a similar centralized 
transfer for the Indian intermediate classes.  
 
The centralized solution to the redistributive problem emerged as an unintended 
consequence of the 1969 riots and the adoption of the New Economic Policy. The 
political consolidation which took place after the 1969 rio ts established UMNO (the 
United Malays’ National Organization), the Malay party in the ruling coalition, as the 
dominant political power in the country. The effect was to consolidate potentially 
competing Malay clientelist groups into a unified structure, and at the same time, to 
establish their political dominance over the largely Chinese-Malaysian capitalists who 
would have to pay for the redistributive rents. We could therefore characterize Malay 
clientelism as centralized clientelism compared to the fragmented clientelism 
afflicting the Indian subcontinent (Khan 1989) or the decentralized, but capitalist- led 
clientelism in Thailand, discussed below (see also Doner & Ramsay this volume; 
Sidel 1996). 
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Figure 2. 9 Resource Flows in Patron-Client Networks: Malaysia in the Seventies 
 
 
The resource flows within patron-client networks in post-1969 Malaysia are shown in 
Figure 2.9. The most important rent-outcome of this rent-seeking system was the 
redistributive transfer rent going from the mainly ethnic-Chinese capitalists (C) to the 
central political leadership (P) of the Malay party, UMNO. This included both legal 
taxes and illegal extractions. Malaysia's rich natural resources also allowed the state to 
tap significant natural resource rents. Collectively, these resources were used to create 
further transfer rents for the intermediate classes in a number of forms, including jobs 
in public sector enterprises and subsidized loans from the banking system (see Jomo 
and Chin this volume), shown by arrows from (P) to (N). The organizational power of 
UMNO was, in turn, based on rent-seeking inputs being expended by the party 
leadership in the form of rent-sharing with lower level clients. Thus the arrows from 
(P) to (N) were sometimes rent-seeking inputs  which maintained the organizational 
power of the ruling party. 
 
A subsidiary type of rent-seeking in Malaysia involved, as its outcome, the transfer of 
relatively small learning rents to domestic capitalists as assistance for moving into 
high technology industries and the capture of natural resource rents by companies 
gaining rights to exploit Malaysia's rich natural resources. These rent flows are shown 
by the arrows from (B) to (C). The implicit transfers which the state organized for 
Malaysia's capitalists were typ ically not the large, explicit rents for learning (as in 
South Korea) but they were nevertheless of economic significance (Jomo 1986; Jomo 
& Edwards 1993). To sustain these rights, capitalists also spent further resources as 
rent-seeking inputs, in lobbying or bribing state officials at various levels (flows from 
C to P and from C to B).  
 
Compared to the Indian subcontinent, the distinctiveness of the Malaysian rent system 
was that the redistributive transfer from the Chinese capitalists was centralized and, 
initially at least, direct links between particular capitalists and political factions in the 
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Indian manner did not exist. By satisfying the demands of the organizationally 
powerful through a centralized redistributive transfer, this strategy separated them, for 
a time, from capitalists seeking rents. The demands of the latter could be evaluated on 
the basis of economic calculations (such as who could offer the highest bribes or the 
highest growth rates for future taxation and bribes) without individual capitalists 
being able to deploy political power to the same extent as in the Indian subcontinent. 
 
Finally, the political stability which Malaysia achieved as a result, allowed it to attract 
high-technology investments. The centralized political settlement, together with the 
fact that large natural resource rents were also available for redistribution, meant that 
domestic redistributive demands could be met internally. As a result, high technology 
multinationals were assured that their global Schumpeterian rents would be protected 
in Malaysia and would not be captured by local political processes. This must have 
contributed to the willing relocation of many of these firms to a cheap labour haven, 
by-passing countries like India which also had plenty of skilled labour. Not 
surprisingly, prior to the financial crisis, multinationals in Malaysia were driving 
exports and technology acquisition to a greater degree than in most other developing 
countries (Jomo 1986: 254-6; Jomo and Edwards 1993).  
 
While Malaysia's centralized redistributive system was, for a time, compatible with 
rapid growth, it was nevertheless less dynamic than the industrial policy system of 
South Korea in the sixties and seventies. Since the bulk of the redistribution was to 
the intermediate classes, this limited the resources which could be transferred to 
capitalists to accelerate primitive accumulation or used as learning rents. Technical 
progress in Malaysia was therefore based on directly attracting foreign investment 
rather than inducing domestic learning. Nevertheless, given the domestic political 
configuration, it is doubtful whether a South Korean industrial policy system would 
have been feasible. The Malaysian state faced much greater political demands for 
redistribution, and the centralized system of redistributive rents was an efficient 
response.  
 
The pattern sketched above has changed to some extent over time. As the Malaysian 
economy has grown, the political power of competing Malay factions within UMNO 
has grown as well (Jomo & Gomez, this volume). As decentralized factions developed 
through the late eighties and nineties, the Malaysian rent-seeking system began to 
slowly approach the Indian pattern with factions increasingly able to play a role in 
protecting rents for particular capitalists. The growing factionalization within UMNO 
was exemplified in the conflict between Prime Minister Mahathir and his erstwhile 
deputy Anwar Ibrahim. If the Malay intermediate class groups are indeed becoming 
more fractured, the centralized rent distribution system shown in Figure 2.9 may no 
longer be feasible. The challenge for Malaysia will be to democratize its polity 
without allowing competing factions to block efficiency-enhancing changes in the 
South Asian fashion. 
 
Thailand. In Thailand, as in Malaysia, the Chinese played an important role in 
business and trade. But in contrast to Malaysia, ethnic-Chinese capitalists in Thailand 
inter-married  with the local population and were linguistically integrated. Thailand 
was also different from all the countries discussed so far in not having experienced 
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direct colonial rule. Perhaps partly as a result, the Thai middle class of professionals, 
salaried workers and the petty-bourgeoisie were politically passive even as late as the 
1980s (Phongpaichit & Baker 1997: 363). Compared to the Indian subcontinent or 
Malaysia, redistributive political factions were dominated to a much greater extent by 
business interests, though there were powerful patrons in the countryside who could 
mobilize large sections of the rural population. There were ongoing tensions in the 
Thai polity between a military-bureaucratic group which wanted authoritarian politics 
to clamp down on clientelism, Bangkok-based capitalists who wanted to take over 
political factions to achieve their own interests, and rural patrons who wanted to use 
their organizational power for developing provincial business and trade interests of 
their own. Despite these tensions, the distinctive feature of Thai clientelism from the 
seventies onwards was that redistributive rents were, in the main, demanded by 
groups which wanted to engage in primitive accumulation to develop business 
interests. While the balance between the Bangkok capitalists, the provincial capitalists 
and the military shifted over time, by the mid-seventies a stable pattern began to 
emerge as provincial and Bangkok capitalists began to collectively dominate political 
factions (Phongpaichit & Baker 1997: 332-354).  
 
 
Figure 2.10 shows the dominant patterns which emerged after the fall of the military 
in 1973, though there were brief interruptions following military coups in 1976 and 
1991. The key arrows are the ones showing rent-seeking inputs from capitalists (C) to 
political factions led by themselves (C), and thence to other politicians (P) and non-
capitalist members of factions (N) who provided the organizational power for winning 
elections. By the seventies, Thai capitalists were running their own political factions 
to a much greater extent than in other developing countries in Asia (Sidel 1996; 
Phongpaichit & Baker 1997: Tables 10.1-10.2). This not only gave Thai capitalists 
places in parliament, but also the political power to bargain for subsidies, franchises 
and licenses, which were the rent-outcomes of their rent-seeking, shown by the arrows 
from (B) to (C) (see also Doner & Ramsay; Rock, this volume). These rents included 
monopoly rents, transfer rents supporting primitive accumulation, and learning rents 
for infant industries. 
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Figure 2.10 Resource Flows in Patron-Client Networks: Thailand in the Seventies 
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The distinctive features of the Thai rent-seeking system were first, the relatively low 
degree of redistributive rent transfers organized by non-capitalist political 
entrepreneurs. Since the capitalist faction leaders of Thailand did not have the social 
legitimacy to demand redistributive rents on ethnic, religious or other ideological 
grounds, Thai transfer rents supported primitive accumulation to a greater degree than 
in Malaysia or the Indian subcontinent. When redistributive factions are led by non-
capitalist intermediate classes, competitive clientelism can lead to the generation of a 
growing number of ideological or ethnic identities to create redistributive rents, as we 
see in the Indian subcontinent. However, when competitive factions are led by 
capitalists, competition between them is more likely to lead to excluded factions 
trying to enter existing high-rent markets, since they cannot so easily create new 
ideological justifications for redistribution to themselves.  
 
A second feature of the Thai rent-seeking system was the intense competition between 
these capitalist-controlled factions. The relatively large numbers of capitalists going 
into the political fray in Thailand reflected the development of trade and commerce in 
the country. Not having suffered an interruption due to a colonial takeover, small 
traders, often Chinese, had accumulated slowly over a century, and by the sixties, 
many of them were substantially wealthy. The vigorous political competition between 
factions controlled by Thai capitalists prevented the political system from being 
monopolized for long by any particular faction. Thus, although the rent-seeking input 
costs in the form of corruption and clientelism were high, long-run economic 
performance was good because the rent-outcomes of this rent-seeking were rapid 
primitive accumulation, and a tendency for new capitalists to enter sectors with high 
monopoly rents. Compared to other developing countries, there was a greater 
downward pressure on monopoly rents. On the other hand, the management of 
learning rents was poor, as the allocation of subsidies depended more on political 
bargaining power than on economic performance. 
 
A key factor which ensured that this rent-seeking system was efficient was the nature 
of the technology which Thai capitalists were adopting in the seventies and eighties. 
In sectors such as textiles, logging, food processing and so on, Thailand was adopting 
technologies which had limited economies of scale, and did not require long periods 
of learning. In particular, they did not require learning rents for successful adoption. 
Rents, in this context, were only useful in accelerating primitive accumulation, as 
soon as that had happened, the competitive bidding down of rents in these sectors was 
socially desirable. This would not have been the case if useful rents had to be 
maintained and managed, for instance if learning was required or if sophisticated 
monitoring and regulatory mechanisms needed to be developed. In the long run, as 
Thailand moves into higher technology sectors, institutional reformers will have to 
face these issues.  
 
The snapshot pictures of resource flows within patron-client networks in this section 
provide a starting point for our analysis of rent-seeking. It is important to recognize 
that these patterns are changing over time and so each pattern is specific to a 
particular phase of a country's development. Nevertheless, once particular patterns are 
recognized, we can ask general questions, the answers to which may be relevant for 
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other contexts as well. In the next two sections we will look at the variables which can 
explain differences in the input costs of rent-seeking and the differential rent-
outcomes in different contexts.   
 
2.4 The Input Cost of Rent-seeking  
 
Conventional rent-seeking models have concentrated almost exclusively on the rent-
seeking cost which is the input cost of rent-seeking. This is the cost to society of 
resources being used up in rent-seeking activities. These activities include lobbying, 
bribing, maintaining political factions and so on, which can potentially absorb a 
significant share of society's resources. The estimation of the rent-seeking cost 
involves two steps. First the magnitude of the rent-seeking expenditure and secondly, 
the social cost of this expenditure have to be estimated. The early rent-seeking models 
used a number of simplifying assumptions to show that the rent-seeking expenditure 
was equal to the size of the rent being competed for. If this was true, then for a total 
rent of $100, the total expenditure on rent-seeking would be exactly $100. For the 
second step, these models simply asserted that this entire expenditure was a social 
cost. We begin by looking at the early models. We then see how with different 
political and institutional assumptions, the rent-seeking cost can be much larger or 
smaller. 
 
The Rent-Seeking Expenditure: Early Rent-Seeking Models. We know that 
individuals will only spend resources on rent-seeking if their expenditures change the 
probability of their winning (or not losing) the rent they are seeking (or which they 
already possess). How much individuals spend in aggregate will depend on how they 
perceive their probabilities of winning are likely to change as a result of these 
expenditures. This is where our assumptions about institutions, bargaining power and 
strategic perceptions become very important. The importance of these assumptions 
can be seen by considering how the early rent-seeking models worked. Later, we will 
consider the effects of relaxing these assumptions. 
 
The key, but often only implicit, assumption in the standard Krueger-Posner type of 
rent-seeking model is that each individual’s probability of winning the rent depends 
on that individual’s proportionate expenditure on rent-seeking. In other words, Ai, the 
probability of individual i winning the rent (of any value R), is given by 
Ai 
Ei
G Ei  
where Ei is the expenditure of the ith person on rent-seeking, and EEi is the rent-
seeking expenditure summed over all persons. If the probability of winning was 
determined in this way, this means that if person i spends $10 on rent-seeking when 
the total expenditure on rent-seeking is $100, i’s probability of winning the rent R is 
0.1. If this is how the probability of winning is determined, we can then determine 
how much would be spent on rent-seeking in aggregate. The answer turns out to be 
exactly R. This is an important result. It says that in this case, if the total rent, R, is 
$1000, the total expenditure on rent-seeking, EEi, will be $1000 as well. The reason 
for this can be seen by looking at the expected gain from “investing” one more dollar 
in rent-seeking. The expected gain is the probability of that dollar winning the prize 
  
32 
(the rent) times the size of the prize which is R. In symbols, i’s expected gain = Ai.R 
where Ai is the probability of i winning the rent with an expenditure, Ei, of $1. For 
instance, if for the last dollar, Ai is 0.25 and the prize is a rent of $1000, the expected 
gain is $250. Since the expected gain of $250 is achieved with an outlay of 1 dollar, 
person i is likely to invest the dollar in rent-seeking.  
 
When is he likely to stop investing further sums? As i (and others like i) keep 
investing in rent-seeking, the value of EEi will keep growing and, as a result, the 
value of Ai will keep falling. Eventually, the value of Ai will fall to the point where 
Ai.R (i’s expected gain) is exactly 1 dollar. Any investment of a further dollar in rent-
seeking beyond that point will not be attractive for i or anyone else. Clearly when EEi 
= R, given that Ei = 1, Ai will equal 1/R. The expected gain from an expenditure of $1 
will then be Ai.R = 1. Any further investment will result in Ai declining further and 
the expected gain from subsequent investments will be less than 1 dollar. Thus, if R = 
1000 and a total of 998 dollars have been spent on rent-seeking, a further dollar spent 
will have a 1/999 chance of winning the prize, giving an expected gain of just more 
than $1 (1000 times 1/999) for an expenditure of $1. The next dollar will have an 
expected gain of exactly $1 as total expenditure, EEi, reaches $1000. Beyond that 
point further dollars spent have an expected gain of less than $1 and further rent-
seeking expenditures will no longer take place. But by then, the total expenditure on 
rent-seeking, EEi, will have reached exactly the value of the rent, R. 
 
This is why early rent-seeking theorists were happy to estimate the rent-seeking cost 
by simply estimating the value of total rents in the economy, usually by adding up all 
the monopoly rents and subsidies. Thus in Figure 2.4, the rent-seeking cost which was 
analytically identified as YZ, could be given a numerical value simply by estimating 
the monopoly rent or the subsidy in the protected sector (Krueger 1974). 
Alternatively, if we go back to Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1, the social cost of monopoly 
was identified as a deadweight welfare loss equal to the small triangle CDE. Now 
rent-seeking theory was saying there was an additional rent-seeking cost which was 
equal to the size of the rent, in this case equal to the much bigger rectangle BCDP2. 
 
Rent-seeking Expenditures Versus Rent-seeking Costs. The theory discussed so far 
estimates the expenditure on rent-seeking, EEi, and assumes that this is an accurate 
measure of the rent-seeking cost. This may not be the case. Not all of the expenditures 
on rent-seeking are expenditures on inputs, and are therefore not a cost for society. If 
some of the expenditures on rent-seeking are transfers from one person to another, as 
bribes can be, the transferred resources are potentially available for production and no 
social cost is involved. Thus, there is a distinction between rent-seeking expenditures 
on inputs which are used up, as opposed to expenditures which simply transfer 
resources across individuals (Tullock 1980b; Browning 1980; Varian 1989).  
 
An example of a rent-seeking expenditure which consumes inputs is lobbying. When 
an industrialist employs a lobbyist to work for him, the lobbyist consumes inputs 
while performing a specified activity. These inputs cannot be used subsequently to 
employ an engineer. On the other hand, an example of a rent-seeking expenditure 
which simply transfers resources is a bribe from an industrialist to a government 
official in exchange for a license. Here, no activity has been performed by the 
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government official which uses up inputs (ignoring the cost of signing pieces of paper 
which would perhaps have to be signed anyway). The bribe transferred is therefore 
potentially available for the same range of uses as before. The recipient could use the 
money to organize production or go for a holiday, just as the bribe-giver could have 
done. As far as society is concerned, inputs have not yet been used up. If all rent-
seeking expenditures were transfers rather than expenditures on inputs, there would be 
no potential loss of inputs for producing final outputs, and therefore, no rent-seeking 
cost. 
 
However, the fact that inputs remain potentially available following a transfer does 
not mean that the allocation of inputs in production is unchanged. Individuals have 
different preferences, and the bureaucrat may use his bribe differently from the 
industrialist. If the industrialist is more likely to invest than the bureaucrat, a bribe 
may have a social cost in a poor country with an investment constraint. Thus, even if 
rent-seeking expenditures are transfers, they can still affect the allocation of resources 
in production. An accurate measure of the rent-seeking cost would have to break 
down any rent-seeking expenditure into three components. First, part of the total 
expenditure may be a pure transfer which leaves final output unchanged. This 
component of rent-seeking expenditures will have zero social cost. Secondly, a part 
may be a transfer which nevertheless changes allocative decisions in particular ways. 
Here, the social cost is the difference in value of final output with and without the 
transfer. This may be difficult to estimate in practice. Third, there may be a 
component which is a true input withdrawal, and this part of the rent-seeking 
expenditure is entirely a cost. The practical difficulty of estimating the true social cost 
of rent-seeking expenditures in this way explains why we usually make the simpler 
assumption that the rent-seeking cost is at least proportional to the rent-seeking 
expenditure. If this assumption is justified, higher rent-seeking expenditures should at 
least imply higher rent-seeking costs. For comparative purposes such an assumption is 
justified as long as the composition of rent-seeking expenditures is roughly the same 
in the situations being compared. This qualification should be borne in mind, though 
we do not have any simple way of correcting our estimates when this is not the case.  
 
The Rent-Seeking Expenditure: Additional Variables. The claim of the early 
Krueger-Posner rent-seeking models was that the rent-seeking expenditure is equal to 
the size of the rent. This, as we have seen, was based on some very special 
assumptions. We now see that if we take into account other institutional and political 
variables, the magnitude of rent-seeking expenditures can be more or less than the 
size of the rent. 
 
i) Institutional Rules. A key assumption of the first-generation models was an 
implicit institutional rule for allocating the rent-generating right. This institutional 
rule said that when individuals or groups spend resources on rent-seeking their 
probability of getting the rent is equal to their share of the total rent-seeking 
expenditure, Ei/EEi. But if the rule for allocating the rent is slightly altered, the final 
rent-seeking expenditure can be substantially more or less than the size of the rent 
(Mueller 1989: 229-46).  
 
For instance, if only a small number of individuals are allowed to enter the rent-
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seeking game, and the rent-generating right is randomly allocated to one of them, the 
total expenditure may be very small. This would be the case if the expenditure each 
person has to make to enter the game is small. Thus, if the rule is that the first five 
people in a queue are allowed to bid $1 for a rent of $1000, which is then allocated to 
one of them by the state, either randomly or according to some autonomously 
determined rule, the total rent-seeking expenditure will be limited to $5. This is a 
simplified version of the argument that insulated, authoritarian or “invulnerable” 
states which can limit the competition over rents can also limit rent-seeking 
expenditures (Chang 1994: 38-44; Kim & Ma 1997). This is also what Hutchcroft 
(this volume) calls “purposive rent allocation” which he contrasts with “competitive 
rent-seeking”. 
 
However, this institutional argument is incomplete. It is not clear why secondary rent-
seeking does not take place. Secondary rent-seeking in this case refers to expenditures 
by excluded groups to change the rent-allocation rule itself since this rule excludes 
many potential rent-seekers from the chance of winning, and also excludes many state 
officials from collecting bribes which they may otherwise have done. In fact, rules for 
allocating rents which exclude many rent-seekers are often contested. One important 
variable which determines the outcome is the distribution of political power between 
insiders and outsiders in the restricted rent-seeking game. If the excluded have the 
power to contest, it is unlikely that they will be effectively excluded in the long run, 
and we should expect to see the exclusionary rules being changed. It follows that 
institutional rules which seek to lower rent-seeking expenditures by limiting the 
access to rents can only work if those being excluded are not powerful enough to 
contest their exclusion. 
 
In contrast, we can also think of institutional rules allowing high degrees of 
competition which may result in much larger rent-seeking expenditures than the rent 
available. One example would be a rule which says that any number of agents can 
compete, and the right is allocated to the biggest spender. Under this institutional rule, 
the rent-seeking expenditure is indeterminate, and may be much larger than the rent 
being competed for. For instance, for a rent of $1000, it is quite possible that under 
these rules, each of 10 contestants bids $990, resulting in $9900 being spent in rent-
seeking. However, this rule too is unlikely to be sustained in a repeated game because 
too many contestants will go bankrupt. Contestants are likely to begin to collude when 
bidding for the rent, but it is difficult to say much more a priori. 
 
In the real world, an institutional rule which is often relevant for allocating rents is the 
democratic rule. This institutional rule says rents are allocated to coalitions of 
majorities in representative institutions. Analytical comparisons of rent-seeking 
expenditures under “democracies” and “dictatorships” have attracted great interest. 
However, it turns out that at a purely analytical level, political institutions have 
indeterminate effects on rent-seeking. Democratic legislatures could be associated 
with high or low rent-seeking expenditures depending on other conditions. As an 
example, Congleton (1980) argued that in democracies, if there is competition in 
forming coalitions, this is likely to drive bribes down to the minimum effective level 
for each legislator. The total bribe paid could then be as low as the minimum bribe per 
legislator for half the legislators plus one.  
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For instance, suppose the minimum bribe acceptable to each legislator is $1 and there 
are three legislators. Suppose also that we start from a position where bribes are high 
and all three legis lators are getting a bribe of $5, represented by (5,5,5). Since only 
two votes out of three are needed for a majority, rent-seekers can offer the first two 
legislators a lower total bribe to form a new coalition which still has the majority 
required to allocate rents. For instance, they could offer (6,5,0). This in turn can be 
bettered (from the rent-seeker's point of view) by an offer of (7,0,1) which costs even 
less but will be accepted by a new majority combination of legislators. This in turn 
can be bettered by (0,1,1). In each case, rent-seekers buys the required two votes, but 
for less and less, till the minimum effective bribe is reached. A game-theoretic version 
of this coordination problem facing corrupt legislators in a democracy is provided by 
Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994). The problem with drawing firm conclusions about 
the rent-seeking expenditure in a democratic legislature is that the result depends on 
the minimum bribe which legislators will accept, and moreover, the minimum-bribe 
coalition may not necessarily be stable. Rent-seekers who have lost out have the 
incentive to offer higher bids to new coalitions of legislators so that bribes can be bid 
up again. Thus, if legislators are powerful enough to demand high minimum bribes, or 
if winning coalitions can be repeatedly overthrown by new combinations, it is 
possible for rent-seeking expenditures to be very high in a democracy. Whether 
democracies actually result in high or low rent-seeking expenditures clearly cannot be 
determined from such abstract models. 
 
Another approach to modelling the rent-seeking cost under democracies comes from 
transaction cost economics. We have seen that the social cost of rent-seeking is not 
necessarily proportional to the magnitude of the bribes and transfers. Thus, even if 
democracy lowered the total bribe, this does not necessarily mean that the rent-
seeking cost is low. One of the true costs of transfers is the transaction cost of 
organizing them. These are the costs of negotiating the size and allocation of the 
transfer. Negotiating uses up resources (in the simplest sense because haggling uses 
up time which could have been spent in production). If failed negotiation results in 
conflict, there are additional costs in the form of strikes or even riots. These are true 
social costs, which may or may not be directly proportional to the size of the transfers 
taking place. 
 
North (1990) calls these costs of organizing transfers the political transaction cost. He 
then puts forward a somewhat different argument for democracy on the grounds that 
democracy reduces political transaction costs to their lowest possible level. The 
intuition here is that the free flow of information in a democracy would make the 
process of striking deals easier and faster compared to other systems. But once again, 
one could argue that whether a democracy ensures the lowest political transaction cost 
for organizing transfers and bribes depends on the distribution of power. If there are 
many groups which are evenly matched, they may each hold out for very small gains, 
in which case the political transaction cost under democracy may be very high. 
Nevertheless, if North is right, rent-seeking costs will be minimized in democracies. 
Note that this result directly contradicts the argument which suggests that an 
invulnerable or autonomous state can ensure low rent-seeking costs. These competing 
models show that it is possible to construct perfectly logical arguments showing how 
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quite different institutions may be better for reducing rent-seeking costs. Equa lly, the 
same institution may be associated with high or low rent-seeking costs depending on 
other conditions. 
 
The theoretical indeterminacy of the rent-seeking expenditure associated with specific 
institutional rules is confirmed when we look at our countries and try to relate rent-
seeking costs to the degree of democratic competition. By this we mean how far their 
institutions allowed free elections, a free press and freedom for groups to organize 
into factions and parties. India was clearly the most democratic of our group of 
countries. Its constitutional arrangements ensured regular elections, a free press and 
many competing parties. The only break in its democratic record was the brief period 
during 1975-77 when Mrs. Gandhi imposed her Emergency.  
 
The other countries are more difficult to rank. In each case, some democratic rights 
were suspended for some part of the period we are looking at. Rights were suspended 
for varying periods, and some rights but not others were curtailed, making a clear 
ranking difficult. Keeping this in mind, we would rank Malaysia next. On the one 
hand, although party choice was limited, Malaysia had a civilian administration 
throughout the period we are interested in. As we saw in Section 2.3, the 
representative structure which emerged after 1969 was responsive to redistributive 
demands coming from its large intermediate classes. On the other hand, many 
organizational rights, particularly of labour unions, were curtailed during the 
Emergency of 1963-66 and some rights remained curtailed thereafter (Jomo 1986: 
236). The ethnic dominance of the Malays in the representative structure which 
emerged after 1969 also made it more difficult for some excluded groups to compete 
for rents. This justifies ranking Malaysia lower than India. 
 
South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan and Bangladesh are at the other end of the 
institutional spectrum as they each suspended civilian administrations for varying 
periods in the sixties, seventies and eighties, followed by controlled transitions to 
democracy. In South Korea, Park Chung-Hee's coup of 1961 established the 
authoritarian state which governed South Korea during its industrialization. The state 
made frequent use of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency to control dissent and 
periodically used martial law in the early years. It also exploited the popular 
perception of impending hostilities with North Korea to institutionalize limits to 
democracy in the Yushin Constitution of 1972. Genuine democratization began only 
in the eighties (Woo-Cumings 1997). Pakistan and Bangladesh were similar to South 
Korea in having an authoritarian state in the sixties following Ayub Khan's military 
takeover in 1958. When the two countries split apart in 1971, gradual moves towards 
democracy began, but with another military interlude in both countries covering 
roughly the mid-seventies to the late-eighties. 
 
The fall of the military government in Thailand in 1973 marked the beginning of its 
slow progress towards greater democratization. However, the military remained 
suspicious of the “corrupt politicians” who dominated parliament and did all they 
could to restrict the power of the legislature. Constitutional provisions allowed the 
Prime Minister and some of his Cabinet to be appointed from outside the legislature, 
and the military was usually successful in ensuring that its candidates remained at the 
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apex. When it felt that parliament was stepping outside its bounds, there were short-
lived coups in 1976 and again in 1991. Despite this, parliament played a function in 
the rent-seeking game by allowing capitalist factions to seek redistributive rents in the 
way described in Section 2.3, and the powers of the legislature gradually increased 
over time (Phongpaichit & Baker 1997: 290-364).  
 
A loose ranking in terms of the degree of democratic competition in these countries 
would, therefore, place India first, followed by Malaysia, and then the other four 
countries, which are difficult to rank further. Fortunately, the precise ranking does not 
matter very much for what we want to say. If North's (1990) proposition about 
democracy is true, India should have had the lowest rent-seeking costs (relative to the 
size of its GDP), followed by Malaysia, and with South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh with the highest. If on the other hand, the argument in favour of 
invulnerable states is true, then the ranking in terms of rent-seeking costs should be 
reversed. On the basis of our earlier discussion, admittedly based on subjective and 
qualitative data, the actual ranking in terms of rent-seeking costs does not fit either 
institutional story.  
 
If we look at the seventies, authoritarian South Korea probably did have lower relative 
rent-seeking expenditures than democratic India (but probably not much lower). On 
the other hand, authoritarian Pakistan and Bangladesh seem to have had higher rent-
seeking expenditures than democratic India. (In a similar vein, Hutchcroft in this 
volume suggests that authoritarian rent allocation also failed to reduce rent-seeking 
costs in the Philippines under Marcos). Thailand's fairly authoritarian regime over the 
same period probably led to one of the highest rent-seeking expenditures, and 
probably higher than the relatively democratic Malaysia. In the eighties, some of these 
rankings change, but once again, there is no simple story. Depending on which 
countries and periods we select, we can find support for either hypothesis.  
 
Clearly, there are other variables which could explain the differences in rent-seeking 
costs in these countries, but the interesting question is whether the effects of particular 
institutional rules also depend on the social context. Chang (1994: 45) points out that 
restricting political competition under authoritarianism is not a simple issue because 
the institutions which will successfully restrict competition depend on the political 
economy of the country. We would go further and argue that the rent-seeking cost is 
not always reduced by attempting to reduce political competition institutionally. 
While an institutional restriction of political competition seems to have worked for a 
time in South Korea, given the weakness of its excluded rent-seekers, such a strategy 
has often resulted in increased secondary rent-seeking costs in other developing 
countries.  
 
The comparison of Pakistan and Bangladesh with India in the sixties and seventies is 
instructive because these countries had very similar social structures. However, their 
political institutions differed as Pakistan and Bangladesh repeatedly attempted to 
restrict access to political power, while giving a small number of players access to 
industrial sector rents. These were precisely the institutional features which are often 
identified as important in explaining low rent-seeking expenditures in South Korea 
(Kim & Ma 1997). However, in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, excluded groups led 
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by the intermediate classes were always successful in vigorously contesting their 
exclusion whenever exclusion was attempted, and this eventually resulted in much 
larger secondary rent-seeking expenditures over time (Khan 1989; 1999). Such was 
the magnitude of this secondary rent-seeking effort that authoritarian regimes in these 
countries either did not survive for long, or did not remain authoritarian in practice.  
 
These examples suggest that whether democracy or authoritarianism has lower rent-
seeking costs will also depend on the degree of fragmentation of society and the 
strength of redistributive factions. Where social factions are weak and power is 
centralized, as in South Korea in the sixties and seventies, the institutions of 
authoritarianism might produce low rent-seeking costs. Where social factions are 
strong and the effective power of the state to suppress them is weak, democratic 
institutions may be necessary to achieve the lowest rent-seeking costs, not only for the 
information reasons suggested by North, but also because they are likely to result in 
lower levels of conflict from excluded groups, and therefore lower secondary rent-
seeking costs. The institutional rule for allocating rent is therefore a useful starting 
point for analysing rent-seeking expenditures as long as we remember that 
institutional rules do not exist in a social and political vacuum.  
 
ii) Sunk Costs and Insider Advantages. Given an institutional structure, rent-seeking 
expenditures can depend on the costs and benefits of the different contestants. Insiders 
in a rent-seeking game may have sunk costs, that is, investments which they have 
already made which are now of little value in other uses. For instance, investments 
already made in patron-client networks, on acquiring insider information and even 
investments in R&D often have this character because they are of little value in other 
sectors. If outsiders know this, rent-seeking is similar to an entry deterrence game, 
where the incumbent paradoxically has an advantage due to prior sunk costs. The 
advantage comes from the fact that the incumbent can credibly threaten to spend 
resources fighting potential entrants even if that implies big losses for a time, since 
part of the incumbent's assets have no value elsewhere. Knowing this, potential 
entrants may decide not to bother to spend resources and the rent-seeking expenditure 
may be very low (Rogerson 1982).  
 
We may then expect challenges from outsiders to be less frequent when insiders have 
established themselves for some time in particular sectors. However, this theoretical 
expectation is not supported by the evidence. Although India's industrial sector was 
somewhat smaller relative to the economy than that of South Korea's at independence, 
big capitalists in India were effectively already insiders. Big business houses, such as 
the Tatas and Birlas, played a key part in the nationalist struggle against British 
colonialism and subsequently enjoyed substantial influence within the Congress Party. 
Their views were influential in the construction of the Bombay Plan of 1944 which 
established the capitalist class as legitimate partners of the state in the construction of 
post-colonial India. Yet the Indian evidence suggests that the insider status of 
established capitalists was not sufficient to limit the overall rent-seeking expenditures 
in the industrial sector. In Malaysia too, the existence of established capitalists did not 
deter rent-seekers. Here, the established capitalists were Chinese Malaysians, but their 
insider status did not deter the most important group of rent-seekers, the Malay 
political elite whose activities entailed inevitable rent-seeking costs (Jomo 1986).  
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On the other hand, the incumbent rent recipients in South Korea in the sixties and 
early seventies were paradoxically much less credible as established insiders. The 
chaebol in South Korea had been tainted by their association with the Japanese 
colonial power and their influence over Park's nationalist regime was correspondingly 
limited. Consequently, the chaebol in the early years did not enjoy the status of 
established insiders. Of the top ten chaebol in 1965, only three remained in the top ten 
in 1975. Since then, greater stability has emerged in the longevity of the top chaebol 
(Fields 1995: 34-5). Nevertheless, rent-seeking expenditures were probably relatively 
lower in South Korea in the sixties and seventies compared to India and Malaysia. 
Thus, the sunk cost advantage of insiders does not seem to correlate well with our 
perceptions of relative rent-seeking costs in these three countries. This does not mean 
that the insider effect is not important. But it does suggest that in our countries, 
countervailing factors, such as the institutional variables discussed earlier and the 
power variable to be discussed next, may have pulled relative rent-seeking costs in 
other directions. 
 
iii) The Distribution of Power. The outcomes of rent-seeking games often depend on 
which of the competitors can inflict the biggest costs on others and hold out the 
longest in expensive contests. These attributes can be described in terms of the 
distribution of the power to contest, bargain and hold out. The simplest model in 
which to see the importance of power is in a rent-seeking contest which takes the 
form of a game of coordination with conflict (the so-called Chicken game). In this 2-
person game, both players gain as long as coordination is achieved (in this case, 
through the creation of a socially-useful right), but the benefits are unequally shared 
since the right and the associated rents go to one person alone (which is the source of 
the conflict). The creation of exclusive property rights is an example. A society which 
creates property rights over resources threatened by free access overuse is collectively 
better off, but the particular individuals getting the rights gain disproportionately. 
Each agent is therefore likely to spend on rent-seeking to become the owner of the 
proposed property right (and of the associated rents), but if everyone engages in rent-
seeking, a clear winner may not emerge which may prevent the right from being 
created at all. 
 
An example of the payoff structure in such a game for two agents, or classes of 
agents, is shown in Figure 2.11. This shows the payoffs to each agent under each 
combination of strategies, with A’s payoffs being shown first. Note that only the 
ranking of the payoffs matters and not the absolute numbers. The payoffs reflect the 
net effect of rent-seeking, that is, they take into account the social value of the rent 
created as well as the rent-seeking cost. In this example, the social value of the rent 
associated with the property right is 14 units. The rent-seeking cost is 1 unit for each 
individual engaging in rent-seeking. The starting point, when the right does not exist 
is shown in the bottom right hand corner of the box, where both players avoid rent-
seeking and get the fallback payoff of 1 unit each. The right is created if one of the 
players engages in rent-seeking. For instance, if A engages in rent-seeking and B does 
not, the right is created for A. As a result, A gets the lion's share of the added value in 
the form of a rent. Even after A's rent-seeking expenditure of 1 unit, she gets a final 
payoff of 10 units, while B gets 5. The total social payoff is thus 15 units, compared 
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to the previous payoff of 2, the difference being the social value of the new right (14 
units) less the rent-seeking cost (1 unit). The individual payoffs are reversed if B 
engages in rent-seeking and A does not, but the total social payoff is unchanged. If A 
and B both engage in rent-seeking, the social outcome is the worst, since both incur 
the rent-seeking expenditure of 1 unit and the right is not created in this round, since a 
winner cannot be decided. Their payoffs are now 0 each, giving a total social payoff 
of zero. Moreover, the rent-seeking is likely to continue in subsequent periods as long 
as each player has the resources to continue. 
 
Figure 2.11 Rent-Seeking Game with Coordination and Conflict 
 
 
 
The equilibrium strategies in this game are indeterminate. If A believes that B will 
engage in rent-seeking, her best strategy is to avoid rent-seeking. It is clearly in B's 
interest to make A believe this. Conversely, if B believes that A will fight, his best 
strategy is to avoid rent-seeking. Each side therefore wants the other to believe that it 
will fight. If both believe they have a chance and engage in rent-seeking, the rent-
seeking expenditure is greatest and the right is not created. This is the worst outcome 
for society with a payoff of (0,0). If neither believes they have a chance, the rent-
seeking expenditure is zero, but in this case society is worse off with a payoff of (1,1) 
because the useful right is not created. The best outcome obtains if only one of them 
engages in rent-seeking. The rent-seeking expenditure is then low and a useful rent-
outcome is produced. What will actually happen in each round depends on the 
reputation of the agents. This is based on their mutual assessments of their relative 
power, which makes their threats to fight more or less credible to their opponents 
(Knight 1992). For instance, if A is very wealthy (and can therefore hold out for many 
rounds of the game) or has acquired a reputation in the past for fighting, her threat to 
engage in rent-seeking is likely to be credible. In this case, B may not bother to rent-
seek and the right may be created for A after the first round. If both agents are evenly 
matched, there may be many rounds of contestation till reputation or the relative 
power of one is established, and the right is created for that person. Thus, evenly 
matched contestants may spend much more on rent-seeking compared to contestants 
who are very unequal. Thus, paradoxically, an egalitarian society may suffer more 
from rent-seeking expenditures when possibilities of new rents emerge. 
A
Engage in
Rent-Seeking
Avoid
Rent-Seeking
Engage in
Rent-Seeking
Avoid
Rent-Seeking
B
0,0
1,1
10,5
5,10
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This example shows why institutional rules may be insufficient for determining the 
magnitude of rent-seeking expenditures. The same institution may lead to high or low 
rent-seeking expenditures depending on the expectations of the contestants. In the 
example above, political institutions implicitly allow both agents free access to the 
rent-seeking competition, but their rent-seeking expenditure depends on how they 
believe the other will act. This belief is likely to be based on the objective relative 
power of the agents. If one is clearly much more powerful in the sense of the ability to 
engage in contests, the other is more likely to give up. With some amendments, a 
model similar to the one above may be used to explain the extent of secondary rent-
seeking expenditures in the context of insulated state institutions. The rule followed 
by the insulated state is that insiders get rights over rents while outsiders do not, 
regardless of their expenditure. However, if outsiders can impose costs on both the 
state and the insiders by engaging in rent-seeking, their strategy will depend on their 
perception of how long their opponents can withstand this contest. Only if the state 
and its insider clients are perceived by outsiders as powerful enough to resist their 
rent-seeking challenge will the rent-seeking expenditure be low. 
 
Thus, low rent-seeking expenditures under insulated states requires that excluded 
social actors in these societies believe they will not be able to change the exclusionary 
rules by secondary rent-seeking (Khan 1995). In contrast, if excluded outsiders feel 
they can win, insulated institutions can provoke bouts of massive rent-seeking 
expenditures. This is why a political analysis is important for revealing the actual or 
perceived power of the different groups engaged in the rent-seeking process. This is 
clearly an area where the rent-seeking methodology can profitably draw on the work 
of political scientists and others working on the relative power of groups involved in 
rent-seeking activities in particular countries. 
 
Our discussion in this section suggests that by looking at a range of variables which 
may determine rent-seeking expenditures, we can go beyond the early models which 
claimed that rent-seeking costs would be equal to the size of the rent. These additional 
variables improve our understanding of why rent-seeking expenditures varied across 
our countries, even though these differences are unlikely to explain performance 
differences on their own. Thus, the observation that South Korea and Malaysia 
suffered lower rent-seeking costs than India may not be wrong, even though the 
differences were probably less dramatic than is often suggested. In the first two 
countries, centralized rent allocation resulted in relatively low rent-seeking 
expenditures not only because of centralized institutions, but also because of a 
distribution of power in society which allowed these institutions to work at low cost. 
In South Korea, this was due to the relative weakness of the intermediate classes, in 
Malaysia because an implicit social contract was constructed which allowed the 
intermediate classes to be centrally accommodated. In India democratic rules and a 
fragmented distribution of social power resulted in higher rent-seeking expenditures, 
but these were probably somewhat lower than in Pakistan and Bangladesh, where 
centralized institutional allocation was, for a time, attempted in societies with very 
dispersed distributions of power. Thailand was an intermediate case. Despite the 
attempts of the military and bureaucracy to maintain centralized allocative rules, the 
distribution of power between competing factions meant that rent-seeking 
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expenditures were very large and centralized allocation did not last very long. On the 
other hand, the dispersion of contestation power was less than in the Indian 
subcontinent due to the lesser role of the intermediate classes. Rent-seeking 
expenditures of all types were possibly as large as in India but lower than in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh as secondary rent-seeking in the form of violent social contestation of 
state policies was less marked. In each case, while the differences in rent-seeking 
expenditures contribute to part of an explanation of performance differentials, it 
should be clear by now that the real differences lay in the rent-outcomes of the rent-
seeking process. 
 
2.5 The Rent-Outcomes of Rent-seeking  
 
In Chapter 1 we saw that there were important differences between types of rents, 
some of the important features of which were summarized in Figure 1.13. While each 
rent is a source of extra income for its recipients, some rents can clearly be socially 
beneficial, while others are socially impoverishing. We also saw earlier that there 
were substantial differences in the rent-outcomes of rent-seeking in our countries in 
terms of the types of rights which were created, maintained or transferred as a result 
of their rent-seeking (Figure 2.6). Why should rent-seeking result in the creation of 
value-reducing rents in some cases but value-enhancing rents in others? This question 
has received relatively little attention in the rent-seeking literature.  
 
To some extent, this is because it is not easy to provide neat answers to this question 
and economists typically dislike messy stories. Nevertheless, the absence of elegant 
theory does not mean that the question can be shelved. Indeed, we would argue that 
not addressing the rent-outcomes of rent-seeking makes much of the rent-seeking 
analysis worse than useless since conclusions based on the input side of the story 
alone may be positively misleading. Fortunately, despite the absence of elegant 
models, we can draw on a broader literature in institutional economics and political 
economy to discuss some of the conditions under which value-enhancing rents are 
likely to emerge. Since rights and rents are evolving over time, we only need to 
identify the factors which allow value-enhancing rights and rents to emerge. Figure 
2.12 shows that the value of any new right created by rent-seeking can be 
decomposed into net gains (equal to x)  for gainers, and net losses (equal to y) for 
losers. Since the net social benefit associated with a specific rent or right is precisely 
the net gain for the gainers after the losses of the losers have been accounted for, the 
net social benefit attributable to a particular right is (x-y). 
 
Figure 2.12 says that the net social benefit associated with any rent can be 
decomposed into gains for gainers and losses for losers. This is simply an arithmetic 
fact, but it may help some readers to see how this decomposition works for the 
simplest case of the monopoly rents analysed in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1. When a 
monopoly rent is created, output falls from Q1 to Q2. The losers are consumers and 
(previous) producers, while the gainer is the monopolist. The gain, x, for the 
monopolist is the monopoly rent, so x=BCDP2. The loss for consumers is equal to the 
shrinkage in the consumer surplus, which is equal to P1FE-P2FD=P1P2DE. The loss 
for producers is equal to the shrinkage in the producer surplus, equal to P1AE-
BAC=P1BCE. The total loss of the losers is y=P1P2DE+P1BCE. The net gain, (x-y), is 
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BCDP2 -P1P2DE-P1BCE=-CDE, which is the deadweight welfare loss, the (negative) 
net social benefit associated with the monopoly.  
 
Figure 2.12 Decomposing the Value of the Rent-Outcomes of Rent-Seeking 
 
 
In the case of other rents too, the net social benefit can be decomposed into gains for 
gainers and losses for losers. In the case of complex rents, such as Schumpeterian 
rents or learning rents, the eventual net social benefit depends on the conditions which 
determine these gains and losses (see Figure 1.7). For instance, the gains from 
learning rents depends on how well the rents are policed and what the recipients have 
to do in return, which can determine whether the eventual gains for society outweigh 
its short-term losses. But in every case, socially desirable rights are created if, and 
only if, x-y>0 for any new rights and rents created. Equally, socially desirable rights 
are maintained if value-reducing changes (x-y<0) are not introduced. Thus, the 
creation and maintenance of desirable rents are closely related.  
 
We want to identify the conditions under which rent-seeking results in the systematic 
creation of socially valuable rents and rights (where x-y>0), as opposed to socially 
damaging rights (where x-y#0). The complication in trying to look for general 
conditions is that these conditions can depend on who is seeking the rent and how. At 
the very least, we have to distinguish between three scenarios. In the first, individuals 
(or groups) privately negotiate changes in rights without involving the state at all. In 
the second scenario, individuals and groups again take the initiative in seeking rents, 
but the state ultimately creates, maintains or transfers rights. Here individuals or 
groups attempt to influence the state by spending resources in bribing or lobbying, or 
by using political pressure. Success now depends on relative influencing abilities, so 
we have to look at how private players manage to get the state to act in their interest, 
possibly against the interests of others. In the third scenario, the state leads initiatives 
to create and change rights according to its own objectives. The state is no longer 
passively responding to influence, but is the primary “rent-seeker”. Here, the agenda 
of the state leadership matters, but social groups also matter because they can support 
or resist the state. In reality, rent-seeking is likely to involve elements of more than 
one of these cases. For instance, the state may simultaneously respond to pressures 
Creation or Transfer of
Particular Rights Results in
The Effect of the New Rights on Net Social Benefits
 =    x -  y
Net Gains for Gainers = x Net Losses for Losers = y
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from society while trying to follow its own agenda. Nevertheless, the simplified 
scenarios make it easier to identify the conditions under which va lue-enhancing rents 
are likely to emerge.  
 
Figure 2.13 summarizes a number of conditions for each of the three scenarios 
(labelled A, B and C), which we discuss in turn. Some are necessary conditions, 
others are necessary in some situations, but not others. It is best to see them as 
conditions which are conducive for the creation and maintenance of value-enhancing 
rights and rents.  
 
Figure 2.13 Conditions for the Creation of Value-Enhancing Rents 
 
A: Rent-Seeking Through Private Negotiation.  In our first scenario, rents are 
created through private and voluntary negotiations between individuals and groups 
with the state playing no role at all. Only one condition is required to ensure that only 
value-enhancing rights are created and this is condition (A-i) in Figure 2.13:  
 
A-i) Gainers always compensate losers. Since this condition is usually met whenever 
we assume voluntary negotiation, nothing more is required. If the gainer has to 
compensate the loser by paying him y, the net value to the gainer of the proposed 
rights (ignoring any additional rent-seeking cost) is (x-y). Therefore, gainers will only 
propose these rights if x-y>0. The net value of these rights for society (again ignoring 
the rent-seeking cost) is also (x-y). This is why, in this case, rights which reduce value 
for society will never be introduced. For instance, a monopoly would never be created 
A: Rent-Seeking through
private negotiation with no
role for the state
A-i) Gainers always compensate losers
B: Rent-Seeking by
attempting to influence the
state
C: Rent-seeking led by the
state
C-i) State officials are value maximizers
who learn rapidly from their mistakes
C-ii) The costs of collecting bribes and
taxes do not differ across groups
C-iii)The state’s institutional structure
allows all costs and benefits to be
internalized
C-iv) Losers do not have the power to
politically resist the state 
Conditions Conducive for the Creation
of Socially Valuable Rents
Different Rent-Seeking
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if the monopolist had to compensate all potential losers before the monopoly could be 
set up.  
 
In practice, this type of rent-seeking is rare. However, an example would be the 
creation of voluntary rules governing access to, and use of, a natural resource such as 
a fishing lake. Such agreements create de facto property rights and natural resource 
rents for the users. These arrangements do in some cases evolve through voluntary 
negotiation, though in practice, some users are almost always excluded without 
compensation and the arrangement is therefore never truly voluntarily negotiated. 
Despite the limited historical evidence for voluntarily negotiated changes through 
rent-seeking, some institutional economists have constructed long run models of 
institutional change with the “as if” assumption that losers are compensated (for 
instance, North 1990). A possible justification for such an assumption might be that 
losers are unlikely to give up without a fight, and  the more they stand to lose, the 
more likely they are to fight. If the conflict imposes costs on the gainers equal to the 
loss of the losers, it may be convenient to assume that losers are always compensated 
even if in reality they are not. The net gain to the gainers will, once again, be (x-y). 
However, such models may be misleading precisely because the cost inflicted on 
gainers in the course of a conflict is often not equal to the potential losses of the losers 
(see also Khan 1995).  
 
There are some important reasons why in the real world important institutional 
changes, such as the creation of property rights, typically do not happen through 
processes of negotiation and compensation. First, all losers typically do not have the 
institutional basis to demand or bargain for compensation. In such cases, rent-seeking 
is by definition not voluntary. For instance, when a manufacturer seeks a monopoly 
right and consumers do not have the institutional ability to demand compensation, the 
rent-seeking process is not driven by voluntary negotiation. Secondly, when large 
differences in power exist between classes of agents, it makes no sense for the strong 
to compensate the weak. Thirdly, even if they were so minded, their commitment to 
compensate losers may not be credible. This is because when the gains and losses take 
place over time, the compensation would also have to be paid over a period of time. 
But the institutional change, once it takes place, will ex post change the bargaining 
power of the losers, usually making them weaker than they were ex ante. The offer of 
compensation in the future is therefore often not credible. As a result, compensation is 
frequently not offered, and if offered, is not accepted as credible. This explains why 
relatively few institutional changes (value-enhancing or otherwise) actually take place 
through compensation, which in turn raises serious questions about the significance 
given to this scenario by theorists. 
 
B: Rent-Seeking By Influencing the State. In the second scenario, individuals or 
groups in society still take the initiative in rent-seeking, but now a state exists which 
enforces rights and contracts. The creation or maintenance of rents now requires the 
participation of the state. But here the state does not have its own agenda, it simply 
responds to social pressures. Social actors seek rents by competing to influence the 
state. Influencing the state can involve spending resources in lobbying or bribing, but 
it can also include political pressure. Influencing can also extend to groups taking 
over the state apparatus by winning elections or organizing coups. Thus, on the one 
  
46 
hand, rent-seeking through the state involves having the economic ability to spend 
resources to influence the state; on the other, it also involves having the political 
ability to organize effectively, as this is an alternative way in which “influence” can 
be exercised.  
 
Ensuring value-enhancing outcomes (that is those where x-y>0) requires that 
influence is proportional to the absolute value of gains and losses. For instance, if the 
creation of a new rent implies that gainers stand to gain $100 and losers stand to lose 
$50, the creation of this value-enhancing rent requires that the gainers should have 
greater (economic and political) influencing power. This will ensure that the value-
enhancing rent is created. Blocking value-reducing changes requires the same 
conditions, in other words, losers should have more influencing power when the value 
of their loss is higher than the value gained by gainers. Thus the creation and 
maintenance of value-enhancing rents is assured if the economic and political power 
to influence is proportional to the absolute value of the gain or loss. Since political 
power is usually not proportional to potential gains and losses from rent-seeking in 
most countries, we need at least a third condition to limit the damage from value-
reducing rent-seeking. This says that it should be possible to satisfy political demands 
for transfers with a stable set of redistributive flows. If this condition is not met, the 
outcome can be even worse. We discuss each of these conditions in turn. 
 
B-i) The spending power of rent-seekers is proportional to their gain or loss. With a 
neutral state which can be influenced, those who can spend more on lobbying and/or 
bribing will win, other things being the same. It would seem at first sight that the 
amount individuals or groups are willing to spend should bear a close relationship to 
the absolute value of their potential gain or loss. This is, after all, the implicit 
assumption in the simplest rent-seeking models where rent-seekers spend as long as a 
cost-benefit calculation suggests positive net returns from such expenditures. If 
groups can spend in proportion to their potential gains or losses, any proposals for 
value-enhancing new rights will win because gainers will spend more than losers, and 
value-reducing changes will be blocked, because losers will spend more than gainers. 
 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Condition (B-i) may not hold because 
groups are not necessarily always able to spend in proportion to their gains and losses. 
Rent-seeking may then result in value-reducing rents being created irrespective of the 
amount spent on rent-seeking. In other words, a responsive state may not only suffer 
from large rent-seeking costs (as we saw in our last section), in addition, the rent-
outcome of the rent-seeking may now also be value-reducing if (B- i) does not hold. 
The most commonly- ident ified reason why condition (B-i) may fail is the collective 
action problem popularized by Olson (1965; 1982). A group which has a larger 
absolute gain (or loss) may not be able to mobilize more resources if it faces a free-
rider problem in collecting contributions from individual members. The severity of 
the free-rider problem depends on many things, but the size of the affected group is 
one factor. Even if a large group collectively faces a large gain (or loss), it may fail to 
raise sufficient resources for lobbying or bribing if there are many free-riders. Small 
cohesive groups may be able to raise more, even though the absolute value of their 
gain (or loss) is smaller. A responsive state may then create rents for small, well-
organized groups simply because they can spend more, even though these rights are 
  
47 
value-reducing for society. 
 
Condition (B-i) could also fail for a number of other reasons. For instance, there may 
be an inter-temporal problem if gains and losses happen at different times. For 
instance, future gainers and losers may have a lower ability to spend compared to 
current gainers and losers because of market failures which prevent the former from 
borrowing cheaply on the basis of their future gains or losses. This problem is 
exacerbated when unborn future generations are affected by current decisions. Under 
these circumstances, value-reducing rights may be created because of these inter-
temporal effects. 
 
The failure of condition (B-i) could explain the existence of inefficient rents in some 
cases. For instance, inefficient industries may keep getting protection or subsidies 
because although their gain is smaller than society’s collective loss, the small number 
of gainers in the inefficient industry may be able to spend more on lobbying than a 
diffuse and large group of losers in the rest of society. Since industrial subsidy 
recipients are always a relatively small group compared to the rest of society, this may 
seem like a promising route for explaining inefficient rents in the industrial sector. 
However, it is not clear that it takes us very far in explaining differences among our 
countries.  
 
First, industrial subsidy recipients in all our countries were a relatively small group. If 
anything, South Korea’s industrial sector was the most concentrated, with a few firms 
dominating each industrial sub-sector (Amsden 1989). Therefore the numbers 
argument does not explain why industrial subsidies were efficient in South Korea, 
since there was as great a likelihood that firms in South Korea should be able to bribe 
the state to have an easy life. Secondly, there are no obvious reasons why our 
countries should have differed substantially in terms of groups raising resources for 
rent-seeking on the basis of future gains and losses. It is true that the South Korean or 
Malaysian state did plan with a longer time horizon than the Indian state, but it is 
difficult to attribute this to the greater ease with which future gainers and losers in the 
first two countries could raise resources to influence the state. Thus while the 
evidence does show that learning rents had dramatically different net social benefits in 
different countries, these differences are not adequately explained by the degree to 
which condition (B-i) held.  
 
B-ii) The political power of rent-seekers is proportional to their gain or loss. 
Political power is not always proportional to economic power. Political power may be 
exercised through mechanisms ranging from the ballot box to political 
demonstrations, riots and civil war. As with raising resources for spending, the 
exercise of political power can also involve a collective action problem, but this is a 
different collective action problem from that involved in mobilizing resources. A 
group which is not able to raise much in the way of resources may be much more 
successful in mobilizing themselves or other people to come out on the streets. In 
developing countries in particular, economically superior groups are not always 
organizationally more powerful. Indeed, organizational as opposed to economic 
power is important for understanding the basis of clientelist politics in many 
developing countries. Organizational power can allow political organizers to create 
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and capture rents even when their economic power is relatively limited (Khan 1989). 
 
Political power is often based on the costs a group can inflict on the state through 
political processes such as votes, strikes or, ultimately civil war, if its interests are not 
taken into account. The creation and maintenance of value-enhancing rights is assured 
if political power is proportional to the absolute value of the gains or losses of 
different groups. This ensures that for any new rent where (x-y)>0, gainers who gain 
x will have greater political power than the losers who lose y, and the rent will be 
created. On the other hand, any rents where (x-y)<0 will be blocked. However, this 
condition is clearly much more demanding than (B-i). There is no obvious reason why 
political power should be proportional to the absolute value of the potential gain or 
loss unless political power is ultimately based on the ability to mobilize economic 
resources. But this link is precisely the one which is often broken in developing 
countries. The political power of different classes and groups is based on such things 
as legitimacy, literacy, political organization and so on, which do not always have a 
close correspondence with economic gains and losses. 
 
If we compare our countries, it is not obvious why groups demanding value-
enhancing rights should have been politically stronger in South Korea or Malaysia 
compared to India. We have already seen that industrial groups did not enjoy a great 
deal of legitimacy in the early sixties in any of these countries. On the other hand, 
there were differences in the political power of unp roductive groups demanding 
redistributive transfers. We will return to this later. Only in Thailand do we find any 
evidence of value-enhancing rent-seeking led by the bargaining power of productive 
groups (see Section 2.3, and also Doner & Ramsay; Rock, this volume). To a much 
greater extent than in the other countries, Thai capitalists used their financial muscle 
to buy political factions which then provided bargaining power within and outside 
parliament. The rather exceptional role of capitalists in Thailand in controlling 
political factions resulted in a much greater correspondence between political power 
and calculations of gain and loss through changes in rights and rents (Condition B-ii). 
This in turn ensured that for a time, rent-seeking through the state produced value-
enhancing outcomes in Thailand. 
 
Capitalist- led rent-seeking in Thailand proved to be much more damaging in a period 
of rapid globalization of financial flows in the early nineties. When virtually limitless 
supplies of cheap funds became available in global markets, the crude link between 
the economic productivity of rent-seekers and their political power was fatally broken. 
If cheap capital is available in large blocks for speculation, speculators in a 
decentralized and competitive clientelist system can acquire rent-seeking power on 
the basis of borrowing, and they could drive the rent-seeking process even though it 
was no longer value-enhancing. In the short run, the speculator’s bets can even be 
self- fulfilling regardless of underlying productivity if other speculators are making 
similar bets on asset appreciation. The financial and property speculation in Thailand 
in the mid-nineties certainly suggests that something like this was happening. 
Paradoxically, therefore, globalization may have contributed to the collapse of 
condition (B-ii) in Thailand, opening up the possibility of value-reducing rights 
rapidly emerging through capitalist- led rent-seeking. This possibility means that Thai 
rent-seeking will have to be much more carefully regulated in the future if its 
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openness to global markets is to be maintained. 
 
Unlike Thailand, there is little evidence that value-enhancing rent-seeking in our other 
countries was driven by the greater political power of productive groups. But this does 
not mean that the distribution of political power was unimportant even in these 
countries. Political power provided the basis for negotiating redistributive transfer 
rents. Redistributive rents were least in evidence in South Korea, but in India and 
Malaysia, intermediate classes were driving value-reducing rent-seeking, which was 
particularly damaging in India. When redistribution is taking place through the 
exercise of political  power, condition (B-iii) is required for the emergence of value-
enhancing rents.  
 
B-iii) Political demands for transfers can be met with a stable set of redistributions. 
We saw in Chapter 1 that rents based on transfers can have negative efficiency and 
growth implications. But are some transfer rents worse than others? Since transfers 
can be the basis of primitive accumulation, they can play an essential role in the 
transition to capitalism. Here, we will only concentrate on transfers to non-productive 
groups, in particular to groups led by intermediate classes, who play, as we saw in 
Section 2.3, an important role in many of these countries. If transfers to these groups 
are being continually re-negotiated, the result is an unstable set of transfers. Such a 
continuous renegotiation of transfers is most likely when there are more potential 
groups demanding redistribution than can be satisfied given the resources available. 
When this is the case, the negative effects of transfers may be much greater. 
 
One reason is that rent-seeking costs will be high if excluded groups continue to 
contest (see Section 2.4). However, there are also likely to be effects for rent-
outcomes. First, the negative incentive effects on other sectors are likely to be higher 
if the transfers grow over time to accommodate further groups. A growing and 
shifting set of transfers will be associated with negative incentive effects which can 
shrink value-enhancing activities in the rest of the economy. Secondly, there is likely 
to be a more subtle effect. Remember that unstable transfers most likely reflect an 
excessive number of groups all of whose demands cannot be met. When this is the 
case, the unstable pattern of transfers is a reflection of the large number of potential 
groups with political power. Under such circumstances, it becomes increasingly likely 
that rent-recipients elsewhere in the economy will develop alliances with dissatisfied 
groups with political muscle which have not yet been accommodated. These political 
alliances can then be used to protect value-reducing rents when they are attacked by 
the state or by groups who suffer damage.  
 
Monopoly rents are more likely to persist under these conditions because their 
beneficiaries are likely to share these rents with political factions in exchange for their 
support. Similarly, rents for learning are more likely to become inefficient if their 
recipients share them with political factions in exchange for their support in protecting 
these rents when the state tries to withdraw them. We saw in Section 2.3 that while 
South Korea suffered the least from redistributive transfers, the Indian subcontinent 
suffered the most. Rent-seeking in the latter was dominated by unstable patterns of 
redistributive rents which reflected the relative size and organizational power of its 
intermediate classes. This can provide at least part of an explanation for the 
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persistence of monopoly rents and of inefficient learning subsidies which effectively 
became monopoly rents for many industrialists. The failure of condition (B-iii) can 
thus play a potentially significant role in explaining poor industrial performance in 
some countries (Khan 1989; 1999).  
 
In contrast in Malaysia, despite the presence of a large intermediate class demanding 
redistribution, their demands could be met by a stable, centralized set of transfers, and 
condition (B-iii) was met. The stability and degree of centralization of the pattern of 
transfers reflected the somewhat weaker position of Malaysia's intermediate classes 
relative to the state, as well as the much greater availability of resources to 
redistribute from both domestic natural resources and a relatively well developed 
capitalist class. This allowed redistributive demands coming from its intermediate 
classes to be met through a centrally negotiated social contract. We have seen in 
Section 2.3 that this stable arrangement had desirable effects for rent-outcomes. By 
accommodating most dissatisfied groups centrally, their political power was not 
directed to protecting inefficient rents, at least during the early years following the 
1969 social contract. 
 
Thailand is an exception since although it was a good performer, its redistributive 
transfers were neither stable nor uncontested, so that condition (B-iii) did not hold. 
Thailand was similar to India in this respect. Both countries had decentralized variants 
of clientelism. However, the difference was that in Thailand, capitalists were in 
control of significant chunks of these redistributive coalitions and used their political 
power to compete for rents through the political process. Thus Thailand fulfilled 
condition (B-ii) to a greater extent than any of our countries, and certainly India, even 
though condition (B-iii) held only weakly if at all. 
 
C: Rent-Seeking Led by the State. In our third scenario, the state acts as an agency 
in its own right in creating, maintaining or transferring rents. The magnitude of the 
rents which the state can capture for its own purposes is an important consideration in 
determining its decisions during the rent-seeking process. The important variables 
determining the types of rents produced now include the motives of decision-makers 
within the state, the transaction costs they face in collecting payoffs, the 
organizational structure of the state which determines which costs and benefits are 
accounted for, and the power of individuals or groups in society to resist changes 
which hurt them. A different set of conditions are now relevant for value-enhancing 
rights to emerge. 
 
C-i) State officials are value-maximizers who learn rapidly from their mistakes. The 
intentions of state leaders now clearly matter. This condition is important because 
state leaders may sometimes have totally non-economic objectives. As an extreme 
example, they may believe that the goal of state policy should be the acquisition of 
cultural or racial purity, even if it impoverishes everyone. However even the most 
insulated societies have not been so insulated that they are untouched by economics. 
Powerful mechanisms operate, forcing leaders to give economic objectives some 
importance, even if they did not do so initially. For instance, there may be pressures 
from domestic groups who aspire to better lifestyles, or military threats from 
economically advanced neighbours. Nevertheless, the less important economic 
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rationality is for state officials, the less likely it is that value maximizing rights and 
rents will be created by autonomously acting states. If value-enhancing rents are to be 
created, state officials have to be value-maximizers. It does not matter whether they 
wish to maximize value to extract bribes for themselves or to maximize social 
welfare. Even if they are only selfish value-maximizers, as long as the other 
conditions hold, there is a good chance that they will maximize social value simply to 
extract larger bribes. 
 
However, it is not enough that state officials want to be value-maximizers. They must 
also have the ability to learn from their mistakes. If they do, the long run effects of 
mistaken beliefs may be minor. On the other hand, if they suffer from long-term 
cognitive failures, this can cause persistent performance failure. Some institutional 
economists believe that cognitive failures must play an important part in explaining 
long run performance differences (North 1995, see Khan 1995 for a critique of this 
argument). 
 
In comparing the leaderships in our countries, we have to be careful not to fall into the 
trap of attributing the performance of the economy to the ex post quality of its 
political and bureaucratic leaders. For instance, it may seem plausible to compare the 
qualities of the bureaucracies in our three countries today and conclude that India 
suffers from an obstructive and unimaginative leadership. Nevertheless, would we 
have said this ex ante, say in 1950? The early leadership of the Congress Party in 
India included modernizers like Nehru, who were strongly committed to 
industrialization and modern technologies. The Indian Civil Service, which the 
country inherited in 1947, was also a relatively competent bureaucracy by developing 
country standards.  
 
Although Indian policy-makers in the sixties appeared less keen to capture world 
markets than their South Korean counterparts, once again, we have to be careful about 
cause and effect. Chakravarty (1987: 16) argues that in India, state support for export-
oriented textile industries was politically difficult since it would have meant 
supporting one regional group of capitalists against others. Given the ability of 
powerful excluded groups to organize opposition, this strategy may not have been 
politically viable for the Indian state at that time, even if it had wanted to maximize 
the growth rate. Indeed, agencies within the Indian state were aware of why their 
industrial policy was going wrong very early on. For instance, an internal committee 
of the Indian state, the Dutt Committee, reported as early as in 1969 that industrial 
policy was failing because the state could not discipline poor performers, and could 
not reallocate resources rationally.  
 
Since Indian state leaders were clearly aware of what was going wrong, the creation 
of value-reducing rents and the adoption of welfarist ideologies which justified them 
may have reflected political constraints rather than being independent variables which 
caused poor performance. Equally, the economic takeoff in South Korea and 
Malaysia were not preceded by wide-ranging changes in the ideologies and objectives 
of their bureaucracies. Rather, they were associated with political changes which 
made new policies and institutions possible, which in turn allowed new accumulation 
strategies. Individuals did  matter, but they only succeeded when they could 
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implement policies because they were consistent with the balance of forces in society. 
Thus, the apparently value-reducing objectives of bureaucrats and politicians can 
often be a dependent rather than an independent variable. To the extent that this is the 
case, we should be careful not to explain differences between countries in terms of the 
cognitive failures of its leaders. 
 
C-ii) The costs of collecting bribes or taxes do not differ across groups.  A selfish 
value-maximizing state may create value-reducing rights which enrich itself rather 
than society. This possibility is much reduced if the state has a long time horizon (see 
Condition C-iv below) and if it does not face different costs of collecting bribes or 
taxes from different groups, which we now discuss. Consider, for instance, a situation 
where this condition does not hold, such that for a value-reducing rent where x-y<0, it 
is easier to extract bribes from the gainers (who gain a small amount x), rather than 
the losers (who lose a large sum y). If the state can extract a bigger bribe from the 
gainers rather than the losers, the value-reducing right and the associated rent may be 
created. If on the other hand, there is no difference in the cost of collection, the losers 
would be able to block the right by being willing to pay more than the gainers to veto 
the change. Thus, differential transaction costs can lead to the creation of inefficient 
rents by states (North 1981). Of course, if the state is altruistic anyway, this condition 
is not necessary. But even if state leaders are selfish, this ensures that value-reducing 
rents are blocked. 
 
This condition is unlikely to hold in full measure anywhere since the collection of 
bribes often requires costly investments in building contacts and, paradoxically, in 
building trust. It is also cheaper to collect a large bribe from a single person engaged 
in a large project (preferably involving the import of large capital equipment which 
can be over- invoiced) than collecting many small bribes from a large number of 
people. This is why corruption often results in the allocation of rights to a few cronies 
of the regime, even when they are value-reducing for society. If officials could 
auction all proposals, rights would be allocated to the highest value-adders, and value-
reducing proposals would be stopped by the bribes of potential losers. Of course, the 
transfers involved would have secondary implications for incentives and investment, 
and in any case a state which publicly declared itself to be open to all offers would 
soon lose all legitimacy. Nevertheless, if the costs of bribe and tax collection varies 
significantly across groups, it is more likely that value-reducing rights will be created 
and maintained. 
 
There is no obvious reason why the transaction costs of collecting bribes and taxes 
should have varied more significantly in some of our countries compared to others. 
Individual businessmen in all our countries had close relationships with state officials. 
In all countries, industrial policies favoured the creation of large capital- intensive 
plants. Collecting a share of the rent from the relatively few businessmen operating 
such plants is cheaper in transaction costs. It may be that large plant technologies 
were favoured precisely because of the transaction cost advantage of extracting bribes 
from large capitalists. India had the most deliberate strategy of promoting small-scale 
enterprises, partly because of Nehru's political compromise with Gandhi's petty-
bourgeois constituency. Large numbers of smaller firms may have made efficient 
corruption more difficult in India, but the performance of India's large plants was as 
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bad or even worse than that of its medium and small plants (Little, Mazumdar & Page 
1987). 
 
C-iii) The state’s institutional structure allows all costs and benefits to be 
internalized. For the state to create rents which add to net social benefits, the state's 
calculation of the costs and benefits associated with the proposed change has to 
coincide with the actual social costs and benefits. In the language of economists, there 
should be no externalities: all costs and benefits have to be internalized. There may be 
many reasons why this may not happen, for instance the differences in collection costs 
discussed earlier may lead the state to ignore some costs or benefits. Here we will 
look at a specific factor which can prevent internalization, the institutional structure of 
the state itself. 
 
If the state is fragmented into a number of agencies each trying to maximize bribes for 
itself, the outcome may be worse than under a centralized state. This is because the 
fragmented agencies are not able to look at the bigger picture and internalize all the 
effects of their separate decisions. An influential model of the negative effects of state 
fragmentation is Shleifer and Vishny's (1993) model of corruption. They assume that 
the state only creates value-reducing rights, such as licenses to import restricted items. 
These restrictions create monopoly rents for license-holders and income for the state 
in the form of bribes, but they reduce net social benefit. The only question for Shleifer 
and Vishny is the bribe price which is charged for each right and the quantity of 
restrictive rights which are supplied under different institutional structures. 
Nevertheless, since the quantity of restrictive rights produced is an aspect of the rent-
outcome, their analysis is a useful starting point, though some of their conclusions can 
change when we look at states creating value-enhancing rents. 
 
Keeping in mind that they assume that the state only creates value-reducing rights, 
they argue that a very fragmented state structure is the best. A totally centralized state 
with a high degree of coordination is next in terms of desirability. But paradoxically, 
an intermediate situation with a semi-fragmented state structure and limited 
coordination is the worst. The optimality of the very fragmented structure follows 
from their assumption that a no-rent economy without state intervent ion is the most 
efficient. If many state agencies compete with each other to sell the output-reducing 
restrictions (such as licenses to import or produce particular items), the bribe “price” 
of these permits falls, eventually to zero, and producers can buy as many of the 
permits as they need. Restrictions effectively disappear, since if anyone can buy at 
zero price the “exclusive” right to import, effectively anyone can import. An efficient 
market outcome then emerges. But we have argued that states can also create value-
enhancing rents. A totally fragmented state will not be able to create value-enhancing 
rents either, say through property rights over scarce resources or targeted learning 
rents. A very fragmented state may therefore not be optimal in a world where value-
enhancing rents exist. 
 
An intermediate level of state fragmentation generates the worst outcome in their 
model. Here, each state agency supplies one of a number of restrictive rights to 
produce or import, but these are collectively required to produce a final product. For 
instance, the right to import steel and glass are supplied by separate agencies, but 
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factories need to have both. A prisoner’s dilemma problem emerges because each 
agency takes the quantity of rights supplied by the others as given, while attempting 
to maximize its own take. Thus the agency supplying permits to import glass takes the 
existing import of steel as given and sets a price for glass import permits to maximize 
its bribe. In the same way, the agency supplying steel import permits takes the imports 
of glass as fixed. They do not realize, particularly if they are playing this game just 
once, that if each pushes up the price of its permit, this will reduce the demand for the 
other permit, which will eventually lower demand for its own permit. The outcome is 
that the bribe (or price) demanded for each restrictive right is set too high. Compared 
to the previous case, many fewer permits are sold and overall productive activity is 
correspondingly lower. 
 
This problem is reduced if the state is totally centralized, and all agencies come under 
a master agency which jointly sets the price of every permit. The master agency can 
then maximize the total bribe by coordinating the “price” of each restrictive right. 
This will typically involve setting the price for each permit at a somewhat lower level 
which takes into account the effect on the demand for other complementary rights. 
While the master agency is only concerned with maximizing the total bribe, its 
coordination nevertheless has the nice effect of increasing value for society. This is 
because the level of each bribe is now lower, more permits are sold compared to the 
second case, and therefore the level of productive activity in the economy is higher, 
and closer to the perfectly competitive situation (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
Effectively, each agency is now forced to “internalize” the cost it imposes on other 
agencies by charging too high a bribe. Thus this institutional structure internalizes 
more (but not all) of the costs of bribe collection and the resulting outcome is 
somewhat closer to the social optimum. 
 
This model may seem to explain why South Korea, say, which apparently had more 
centralized state agencies, also had less damaging forms of corruption than countries 
in the Indian subcontinent. But on closer inspection, the model has a number of 
problems. Shleifer and Vishny are talking about the institutional structure of agencies. 
The failure of state agencies to coordinate is more often the result of the dispersed 
political power of the rent-seekers affected by the state. For instance, it is possible for 
states with formally centralized institutional structures to behave in a fragmented way 
if, for instance, powerful but dispersed interest groups can prevent coordination by 
state agencies. Thus, institutional centralization is not sufficient for coordination. The 
Pakistani state in the early sixties, for example, was institutionally as centralized as 
the South Korean state, but it was far less successful in coordinating agency actions.  
 
Moreover, states whose formal institutional structures appear to be fragmented can 
sometimes behave in a coordinated way, particularly in repeated games. Shleifer and 
Vishny's analysis is of a one-shot game, which is particularly inappropriate for 
modelling state-society interactions. Institutionally fragmented agencies could begin 
to act in a coordinated way in a repeated game provided the payoffs from coordination 
are large compared to the payoffs from non-coordination, the time discount of 
officials is sufficiently low so that they do not ignore the future completely, and most 
importantly, the agencies are not involved in protracted political conflicts over how 
the spoils should be shared. Thus, institutional centralization may not even be 
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necessary for coordination to emerge in repeated games. In fact, even in South Korea, 
the centralization of the state was not absolute. There were different agencies such as 
the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Finance and the President making 
decisions, but in a repeated game, their decisions were effectively coordinated. The 
agency structure which concentrated key decisions in a small number of agencies in 
South Korea offers, at best, a partial explanation of its good coordination. More 
important was the distribution of power between the key players in its rent-seeking 
game (see Section 2.3) which allowed coordination to be effective and made South 
Korea significantly different from other institutionally similar competitors. 
 
Finally, the Shleifer and Vishny model takes as its benchmark the neoclassical model 
of efficient competitive markets with no rents and no intervention. In reality, states 
can and do create value-enhancing rents as well. The optimal institutional structure of 
the state, when we allow for this possibility, is more problematic. If sectors and 
projects are technologically complementary, innovation and learning may be 
accelerated if the structure of rents is centrally coordinated (Aoki, Murdock & Okuno-
Fujiwara 1997: 6). This is because in this case, each project has large external benefits 
for complementary projects, and net social benefits will be higher if investments in 
these projects are coordinated. In this case too, centralized states have an advantage in 
creating value-enhancing rents compared to fragmented states (although very 
fragmented states are no longer desirable). In fact, South Korea in the sixties followed 
this type of technology trajectory. Its relatively centralized state structure would have 
helped state officials to internalize more of the external benefits of learning when they 
were determining the allocation of rents for learning. This is a very different story 
from the one described by Shleifer and Vishny, even though there is a superficial 
similarity in the conclusion that centralized states produced more efficient rights by 
internalizing external effects. In either case, South Korea's state structure satisfied 
condition (C-iii) and contributed to the internalization of all relevant costs and 
benefits.  
 
In contrast, if technologies are small-scale, or if projects are substitutes, too much 
central coordination may be counter-productive. It may lead to large and avoidable 
losses when “coordinated mistakes” are made, for instance, in the selection of an 
integrated set of investments which collectively turn out to be wrong. In these cases, 
since each project has few externalities for other sectors, the economy may benefit 
from a more fragmented set of institutions through which competing value-enhancing 
rents are created. This allows greater competition among competing sets of rent-
generating projects, which may be more socially beneficial by maximizing entry and 
minimizing risk. This seems to have been the case in Thailand under its competitive 
clientelism (Doner & Ramsay, this volume). Thus, given the different technology 
trajectory which Thailand followed, although its state institutions were more 
fragmented compared to South Korea, it did not necessarily contravene condition (C-
iii) too seriously, since its technologies were relatively small-scale, with few 
externalities. 
 
A range of state structures may therefore be optimal for creating value-enhancing 
rights and rents, depending on different technologies and their associated externalities. 
Condition (C-iii) simply says that the institutional structure should be such that all 
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external costs and benefits of decisions are accounted for. If complementary value-
reducing rents are being created, (the Shleifer and Vishny case), a totally fragmented 
state is best, but a centralized state will minimize the social damage compared to a 
partially fragmented one. However, when value-enhancing rents are being created, a 
centralized state will be most conducive for value-enhancing outcomes, but only if 
technologies are large-scale or complementary, with many externalities. In contrast, 
when technologies have few externalities, there is little benefit in coordinating but 
there could be large costs if coordinated mistakes occur. In this case, more fragmented 
states with lesser agency coordination may be better for creating value-enhancing 
rents.  
 
C-iv) Losers do not have the power to politically resist the state. Our final condition 
examines the minimal political requirement relevant for this scenario. The state 
should not face strong political resistance from losers. This condition is usually not 
identified in the literature, but is necessary for the creation of value-enhancing rights 
when the state is an autonomous actor. However, one consequence of this condition 
not holding is widely recognized, and that is the effect on the time horizon of state 
leaders. If this time horizon is very short, it is very likely that state leaders will try to 
extract resources from the economy by increasing their share of rents, even if that 
results in the size of the pie shrinking. If their time horizon was longer, this would not 
make sense, since they would be better off getting a constant share of a growing pie. 
While the time preference of state leaders can sometimes be an independent variable 
(some leaders are just impatient), it is often actually a reflection of the vulnerability of 
the leadership. When leaders face very strong opposition from society, perhaps 
because they lack legitimacy, their response is often to make money fast and get out. 
In such cases, the time preference of leaders is not an independent variable, but is 
determined by the political (in)stability of the state.  
 
Here, we will examine a more important implication of political resistance. When 
states face strong political resistance from those who stand to lose from the creation of 
particular rents, these rents may obviously not be created, even if they add value for 
society. Thus, even if x-y>0, if losers can politically resist by imposing high costs on 
the state (described as transition costs in Khan 1995), the change is unlikely to go 
through. Condition (C-iv) clearly has close parallels with condition (B-ii), which was 
relevant when different groups were influencing the state. Even if influence is not 
involved, powerful losers can still stop change. As with condition (B-ii), the failure of 
this condition can either result in value-enhancing rights not being created, or being 
created at very high rent-seeking cost, which in this case is the transition cost which 
losers can inflict on the state.  
 
The extent to which condition (C-iv) is fulfilled often depends on the relative power 
of the clients of the state. Where its clients are weak, the state is able to dictate terms. 
We have elsewhere argued that such a relationship between a state and its clients is a 
feature of patrimonial patron-client networks (Khan 1996a; 1996b). In such a context, 
the state may be able to override sectional interests to achieve value maximization. In 
contrast, where its clients are strong, the state cannot easily hurt them. This, in 
contrast, is a feature of clientelist patron-client networks, since now, clients call the 
shots. Condition (C-iv) fails in clientelist networks and the state may fail to produce 
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value-enhancing rent-outcomes because powerful clients are able to resist changes. 
 
Our discussion of patterns of redistributive rent flows in Section 2.3 is once again 
useful because it helps us to identify the underlying distributions of power in our 
countries. The political isolation of capitalists receiving rents for learning in South 
Korea made it the country in our sample which most closely fulfilled condition (C-iv). 
Value-reducing learning rents could be terminated without the losers being able to 
resist these changes politically. The distribution of political power within South Korea 
provides the best example of patrimonial patron-client networks in action, certainly 
during the period of high industrial policy in the sixties, seventies and the first half of 
the eighties (Figure 2.8 in Section 2.3). In contrast, the flows between patrons and 
clients in India (Figure 2.7) provides an example of clientelist patron-client networks, 
where condition (C-iv) broke down most significantly. The state faced significant 
political resistance whenever it attempted to change the allocation of rights and rents 
according to any independently defined criteria. Therefore, to the extent that states in 
these countries were trying to push their own developmental agendas, condition (C-iv) 
suggests that the state would be most likely to produce value-enhancing rents in South 
Korea and least likely in India. 
 
Malaysia (Figure 2.9 in Section 2.3) was in an intermediate situation. It did have a 
powerful clientelist constituency, but it was centralized and did not provide, at least 
initially, the incentives for value-reducing alliances between threatened capitalist 
interests and clientelist factions seeking payoffs for their political support. As a result, 
the political resistance facing the Malaysian state when it tried to change specific 
rents was higher than in South Korea, but lower than in India. Thailand (Figure 2.10) 
is an anomalous case because the large numbers of autonomous centres of power in 
this country could theoretically have resulted in serious political constraints facing the 
state if it had tried to follow an autonomous agenda. But the evidence suggests that the 
state in Thailand played a more responsive role during its high growth phase, and 
played a lesser role in taking the lead in allocating sectoral and firm-level learning 
rents to accelerate development. This does not mean that learning rents were not being 
allocated in Thailand. Indeed they were, as Rock (this volume) argues. However, 
because Thai rent-seeking was predominantly responsive, as in our Scenario B, its 
failure to meet all the conditions required for state- led rent-seeking was less 
damaging. In contrast, in our other countries, the more significant leading role of the 
state and the weaker role of capitalist-led rent-seeking makes their rent-seeking closer 
to our Scenario C. 
 
Clearly, states played an autonomous role in all these countries, the difference is only 
in extent and significance. In all of them, the degree to which conditions (C-i) to (C-
iv) held was therefore important. Differences in ex-ante leadership qualities (C- i) and 
in the transaction costs of collecting bribes and taxes (C- ii) were less dramatically in 
evidence across our countries. There were differences in the institutional and 
organizational structure of the state (C- iii), but in most Asian countries, states were 
relatively centralized. In some cases, as in the Indian subcontinent and in Thailand, 
the state behaved in a more fragmented way. This was only partly due to differences 
in the formal institutional structure, and to a larger extent due to differences in the 
distribution of bargaining power within these countries which allowed different parts 
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of the state to be captured by competing factions. This brings us to differences in the 
political power of potential losers, (C- iv). Drawing on Section 2.3, the evidence 
suggests that the potential resistance faced by states trying to impose particular rent-
outcomes varied greatly. 
 
 
Figure 2.14 summarizes the discussion in this section by listing the critical differences 
between our countries. While rent-seeking of the type described in each of our three 
scenarios was going on in every country, the balance did vary. Figure 2.14 records the 
preponderant forms in each country based on our discussion. Rent-seeking in South 
Korea during its high growth phase in the sixties and seventies was very largely led 
by the state, as in scenario C. Society- led rent-seeking in South Korea at that time was 
not a significant part of its industrial performance story. Most of the conditions 
required for value-enhancing rent-seeking held. But the political condition, (C- iv), is 
particularly important because it differentiated South Korea most significantly from 
the others. However, by the mid-nineties, this condition for the effective operation of 
state- led rent-seeking may no longer have held, and in any case South Korea's 
industrial policy regime began to be substantially dismantled at this time. 
 
India and Malaysia had state- led and society- led rent-seeking. The poor performance 
of India was attributed particularly to the failure of conditions (B- iii) and (C-iv), 
which are closely related. The absence of a stable set of transfer rents in India was a 
symptom of a distribution of power which also resulted in strong political resistance 
to state- led rent changes whenever this hurt powerful constituencies. The failure of 
these conditions distinguished India from Malaysia. But changes in Malaysia's social 
and political context meant that by the mid-nineties, the differences with Indian rent-
seeking were becoming less marked. It has to be remembered, though, that by then 
Malaysia was a much richer country and the severity of their developmental problems 
was no longer comparable.  
Country/
Region
Scenario(s) appropriate for modelling
dominant rent-seeking processes
Conditions explaining
differences in rent-outcomes
Indian
Subcontinent
B and C
(B-i)-(B-iii) did not hold
(C-i)-(C-iii) partially held
(C-iv) did not hold
South Korea Primarily C (C-i)-(C-iii) partially held
(C-iv) held
Malaysia B and C
(B-i)-(B-ii) did not hold
(B-iii) held
(C-i)-(C-iv) partially held
Thailand Primarily B
(B-i)-(B-ii) held
(B-iii) did not hold
(C-i)-(C-iii) partially held
(C-iv) did not hold
Figure 2.14 Key Conditions Explaining Differences in Rent-Outcomes 
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Finally, Thailand had primarily society- led rent-seeking. This was large ly capitalist-
led from the seventies, and the fulfilment of conditions (B-i) and (B-ii) contributed to 
value-enhancing rent-outcomes. The globalization and unprecedented financial flows 
of the nineties upset the internal balance which kept political power roughly 
proportionate to economic productivity. Foreign capital inflows gave a rent-seeking 
advantage to speculative capitalists who were primarily interested in short-term 
returns from asset price inflation. The shift in policy-making in favour of these groups 
resulted in a self- fulfilling asset inflation for a time but, inevitably, the bubble finally 
burst in 1997.  
 
We have drawn on institutional economics and political economy to identify a number 
of conditions which could explain differences in rent-outcomes in a specific group of 
countries. A look at other countries or periods may throw up other conditions which 
are important. We have also seen that the presence or absence of specific conditions is 
not enough to ensure, or rule out, value-enhancing rent-outcomes. Rather, a mix of 
institutional and political conditions seems to be required, and some of these 
conditions can compensate for the absence of others. The mix which does work also 
depends on technologies and global market conditions. These complexities prevent us 
from constructing simple models of the determinants of rent-outcomes. However, we 
can identify some conditions which appear to have been important. 
 
This analysis can help to assess the prospects of particular reforms. For instance, the 
experiences within the Indian subcontinent suggest that if the political settlement 
cannot be changed, democracy or authoritarianism makes little difference for rent-
outcomes. In these countries, constructing a social contract which reduces the 
blocking effect of clientelist factions must clearly be an important priority. Malaysia 
suggests one solution to the problem of constructing a social contract which sustained, 
for a while, value-enhancing rent-outcomes. The South Korean model of the seventies 
is unlikely to be useful for countries suffering from clientelist political constraints, as 
the unique political settlement underlying its success is not likely to be reproducible. 
On the other hand, South Korea may have more to learn from other developing 
countries as its political settlement begins to approximate the more typical pattern and 
political resistance to state-led rent creation increases. Thailand appears to be a 
tantalizing model for many developing countries. Its internal political balance was 
also unique, but it was one which a number of developing countries may eventually 
move towards. But the success of the Thai rent system was itself dependent on 
particular technology and global market conditions. The challenge for the future is to 
devise institutional structures which can manage rents in the typical developing 
country polity dominated by strong intermediate classes, where the adoption of some 
technologies require the management of learning rents, and where the gradual opening 
up of capital markets introduces new challenges. 
 
2.6 Rent-Seeking as Process: Conclusions  
 
Our analysis of rent-seeking as a process distinguished between the input costs of 
rent-seeking and the rent-outcomes. While substantial rent-seeking costs were 
observed in all the countries we looked at, they differed greatly in terms of the rent-
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generating rights created as a result of these expenditures. Conventional rent-seeking 
models misrepresent the rent-seeking problem by presenting only one side of the 
process, the input side, which eats up resources in rent-seeking costs. We also need to 
understand why the rent-seeking process created very different rent-outcomes in 
different countries, as these differences explained much of the differences in the net 
effects of rent-seeking.  
 
There were differences in rent-seeking costs across countries, but the institutions 
which reduced rent-seeking costs varied, depending on political conditions. Thus, 
authoritarian regimes succeeded in reducing rent-seeking costs in some countries, but 
in others, they resulted in higher rent-seeking costs than in similar countries with 
democratic institutions. Similarly, attempts to reduce the competition for rents by 
reducing the number of players in the rent-seeking game worked in some countries 
and not others. The success of exclusionary strategies depended on the relative 
contestation power of the groups included in, or excluded from, the rent-seeking. 
 
To explain differences in rent-outcomes across countries, we drew on political 
economy and institutional economics. We found that differences in institutional 
structures often provided an initial explanation for some of these differences. In 
addition, differences in the political power of competing groups, and differences in 
their ability to resist change also had considerable explanatory power. This is 
particularly important as political variables have typically been given little attention in 
the rent-seeking literature. Furthermore, the rent-seeking process is itself evolving, 
and there are important differences in the net effects of rent-seeking over time. 
 
Some of these results have obvious implications for policy. First, the stress which is 
usually put on the magnitudes of rent-seeking expenditures is at best emphasizing half 
of the problem. The qualitative data suggests that the variance in rent-seeking costs is 
less significant than the variance in the social value of the rents created by the rent-
seeking. Thus, even if rent-seeking costs could be cut back very substantially in 
poorly performing countries, as long as the rent-outcomes continue to be value-
reducing, the impact on performance may be limited. Secondly, improving rent-
outcomes appears to be not just a problem of getting the institutions and policies right. 
The value of the rent-outcomes also depends on the interdependent effects of 
technologies, institutional strategies and the distribution of bargaining power in 
society. In some cases, policy can focus on adjusting institutions and technologies to 
political realities. In other cases, responses which seek to directly change the political 
reality may be a precondition for achieving better results. 
 
An important conclusion which we draw is that a number of rents, and the rent-
seeking which sustained them, played a critical role in the rapid development of 
capitalism in the East Asian countries. Not only was the creation of rents critical for 
primitive accumulation and learning, transfer rents were critical for maintaining 
political stability even though the economic implications of these transfers varied 
significantly. The role of rents in economic development is worth stressing in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of the late nineties. The depth of this crisis led many 
economists to link the immediate economic woes of the region to the systems of rents 
and rent-seeking popularly described as crony capitalism. The implicit counterfactual 
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to “crony” capitalism is a “genuine and impartial” capitalism of free markets, zero 
rents, fair market-determined returns for everyone, and a minimal state which only 
maintains a level playing field. However appealing such a mythical capitalism may 
be, our discussion has been concerned to establish that such a model is not relevant 
for developing economies, and perhaps not for any economy. The relevant distinction 
is between rent-seeking systems which are developmental and those which are 
crippling. The relevant policy question is to understand how one may transform into 
the other. 
The financial crisis was related to the nature of rent-seeking in East Asia and some of 
the inter-connections were explored in our analysis. The immediate cause of the crisis 
was the role played by speculative capital flows which were inadequately regulated. 
The regulatory failure could have been due to the over-confidence of policy-makers in 
high growth economies, but it could also have been exacerbated by rent-seeking 
pressures from the beneficiaries of rents in financial markets. We have argued that 
there were good reasons why such pressures could have emerged. The possible role of 
rent-seeking in bringing about the financial crisis should not, however, take attention 
away from the many other types of rents and rent-seeking determining the long-run 
economic performance of these countries. 
 
The long-run relationship between rent-seeking and growth is of much greater 
interest. If growth requires the management of growth-enhancing rents rather than the 
abolition of all rents, high growth countries will always have rents and will therefore 
inevitably have to live with rent-seeking. Globalization and liberalization will not 
change this fundamental economic problem nor is globalization or liberalization likely 
to succeed if policy-makers attempt to proceed on the basis of inappropriate no-rent 
market models. The no-rent model of market development remains compelling not 
because the evidence supports it, but because its policy implications are much simpler 
to understand. Our analysis suggests that identifying the conditions which have in the 
past been conducive for growth is a much more challenging task. The conditions 
which allow value-enhancing rents to emerge and which limit rent-seeking costs vary 
from country to country because countries do not have the same political conditions, 
and they do not follow the same technology trajectory. This is where a deeper 
examination of the historical evidence is important to warn us against falling for 
seductively simple theories. There is no evidence in Asia, possibly no evidence 
anywhere, of long-run development taking place on a no-rent basis. Instead, the 
policy challenge is to construct and reconstruct institutions and politics in developing 
countries to sustain developmental rents and rent-seeking while attacking value-
reducing rents and rent-seeking. 
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